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It Walks Like a Duck, Talks Like a Duck,...
But Is It a Duck? Making Sense of
Substantial Similarity Law as it Applies
to User Interfaces
Ellen M. Bierman*
In copyright law, a plaintiff must prove copyright infringe-
ment through proof of valid copyright ownership and copying.
Copying may be proved through circumstantial evidence of
access to the copyrighted material and "substantial similarity"
between the protected work and the allegedly infringing work.
In the Ninth Circuit, the case law has created confusion about
how to apply the substantial similarity test to different kinds
of subject matter, especially software user interfaces. More-
over, recent cases do not comport with the original Ninth Cir-
cuit test announced in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods.
Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. 1; the test may "walk like a substantial
similarity test and talk like the Krofft test," but it is not clear
that the same results are achieved. This Comment addresses
these recent Ninth Circuit cases, explains why they are never-
theless desirable, and examines how the court should apply
substantial similarity analysis to user interfaces in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted copyright law, which grants limited
monopolies to authors in the exclusive use of their writings, to
further the constitutional mandate of promoting science and
the useful arts.2 Copyright law also seeks to balance two com-
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1. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
2. The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to "promote the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
320 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 16:319
peting social interests: (1) rewarding an individual's creativity
in order to encourage progress; and (2) enabling others to use
and build upon the fruits of such creativity as soon as possible.3
To balance these competing goals, copyright law rewards and
protects creativity by limiting other individuals' rights to use
an author's creation. However, copyright protection is limited
to the author's expression-the ideas embodied in the creation
are freely available for public use.4
In light of these goals, Congress and the courts have devel-
oped a set of principles and doctrines that define copyrightable
subject matter and that limit protection within such subject
matter to the incident expression. Incident expression is
expression that is not essential for the realization of an idea.
The United States Copyright Act explicitly defines the
subject matter that can be protected.5  The Act is supple-
mented by doctrines such as the idea/expression dichotomy,6
merger, and scenes a faire, all of which limit the protectable
matter to the author's original and incident expression.7 Only
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8.
3. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163; Michael Bixby, Synthesis and Originality in Computer
Screen Displays and User Interfaces: The "Look and Feel" Cases, 27 WILL.AETTE L.
REV. 31, 33 (1991).
4. For example, the idea of producing a book to help people manage their time is
not protectable; however, the book's description of how to accomplish time
management is probably protectable.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976). The Act limits copyright protection to "original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." Id. It also enumerates all
possible categories of copyrightable subject matter and includes: "(1) literary works;
(2) musical works ... ; (3) dramatic works ... ; (4) choreographic works; (5) pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7)
sound recordings; and (8) architectural works." Id. The Act further limits what is
protectable by specifically excluding ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of
operation, concepts, principles, and discoveries (e.g., preexisting factual information).
Id. § 102(b).
6. For any subject matter, one of the most difficult problems in litigating
copyright infringement is distinguishing between the unprotectable elements, such as
ideas, and the protectable expression. John Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of
Patent Law, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 121-24 (1991). This analysis is often referred to as
the idea/expression dichotomy. For a comprehensive discussion of the idea/expression
dichotomy, see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§§ 2.03[D], 13.03[A][1], [B][2][a]-[2][b] (1992) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
Judge Learned Hand's "abstractions test" is often quoted as the leading judicial
method for separating idea from expression. See discussion infra notes 29, 244.
7. The merger doctrine states that when an idea can only be expressed in one or a
limited number of ways, the expression is considered inseparable from the idea and
therefore is not protectable. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1990),
amended, reh'g denied en banc, 1990 U.S. App. LExis 20420 (9th Cir. 1990).
Concomitant with merger, the scenes a faire doctrine denies protection to that which is
1992] Substantial Similarity Law
original and incident expression is protectable by copyright
law; otherwise, an author would indirectly receive a monopoly
on the underlying idea because no one else could use the idea
without including the author's expression.
Application of these doctrines and principles has not
always been consistent as copyright law has evolved to
embrace new technologies, such as computer software. Few
people would disagree that computer software is copyrightable
subject matter.8 However, courts continue to struggle with the
scope of protection appropriate for different parts of computer
software, such as the screen displays and user interfaces.9 In
addition, courts struggle with the application of traditional
copyright doctrines to software programs.
Typically, courts confront these issues under the umbrella
of the "substantial similarity" analysis. Courts use substantial
similarity analysis to infer improper appropriation when the
expression contained in two works is so alike that one appears
to be copied from the other.10 In deciding whether a work is
substantially similar to another, a court must use various copy-
considered "standard treatment" of an idea within a particular industry. Data East
U.S.A. v. Epyx, 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988). For an overview of the merger and
scenes a faire doctrines, see NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[B][3]-[4].
These doctrines can be viewed as either limiting the scope of protectable
expression, or as defenses to what would otherwise constitute infringement of
protected expression. Nimmer prefers the latter view because it means that the
expression will be evaluated in light of the specific facts of the case instead of declared
exempt from protection. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[B][3].
8. See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992);
Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec, 1990 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,514 (N.D.
Cal. 1989), aff'd in part and vacated in part, Data East, 862 F.2d 204; Broderbund
Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986); see also Gregory C.
Damman, Copyright of Computer Display Screens: Summary and Suggestions, IX
COMPUTER/L.J. 417 (1989), for an explanation of the development of the law on this
topic.
9. The user interface of a computer program (or application) is that part of the
software that communicates with the user, allowing the user to guide the program to
perform specific tasks and allowing the program to give the user feedback about what
is taking place or what tasks can be performed. Loosely, the user interface includes all
of the screen displays, sounds, input devices, and software necessary to accomplish this
communication. Typically, a user interface supports several mechanisms for achieving
this communication, including some kind of command or menu interface and an
interface to a keyboard or "mouse" (graphical cursor) device. In addition, most
modern graphical user interfaces support sophisticated displays with colored images
that help promote the specific "style" of a particular user interface. The specific
components of any user interface, its behavior, and its style will vary, according to the
program's intended use and audience.
10. See NImMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.01[B].
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right doctrines" that define and limit protectable elements of
the infringed work.
In general, different courts apply different versions of the
substantial similarity test. The Ninth Circuit's version of the
substantial similarity test is particularly difficult to apply to
user interfaces for two reasons: First, the application of copy-
right law to user interfaces is inherently problematic. Second,
recent developments in the case law have obfuscated the test.
The first difficulty in applying the substantial similarity
test to user interfaces relates to the inherent dual nature of
such software: the mixed functional and aesthetic nature of
user interfaces makes it difficult to separate protectable from
unprotectable elements. On the one hand, a user interface
serves the fundamental purpose of enabling a user to commu-
nicate with the software (and the underlying computer) in
order to accomplish specific tasks. Functionally essential ele-
ments of the interface that are necessary embodiments of pro-
cedures, processes, and ideas, are specifically excluded by the
copyright statute.12 In general, utilitarian works are given a
limited scope of copyright protection.'3
11. These doctrines include merger and scenes a faire. See supra note 7.
12. The pertinent language in § 102(b) states as follows: "In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
13. See § 101 definition of "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," which limits
protection of the design of useful articles to the features that are capable of
independent existence from the utilitarian aspect. Id. § 101. This restriction may
motivate attorneys to promote copyright protection for display screens under the
"literary works" category because the screens may be more likely to receive broader
protection if they are not categorized as "useful articles." Note, however, that the
classification of a work does not prevent application of the useful article exception.
See, e.g., Harper House v. Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying the useful
article exception to non-texual utilitarian features of a work with extensive textual
components). In a recent case, Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12219 (N.D. Cal. 1992), the court applied the useful article exception to user
interfaces.
Many authors debate the scope of protection to be granted to user interfaces.
Some of the scope of protection problems peculiar to user interfaces involve the
interrelationship between patent protection and copyright protection, the applicability
of the "useful article" defense to copyright infringement, the role of functionality in
determining proper scope of protection, and the meaning of originality and derivative
work. Last Frontier Conference Report on Copyright Protection of Computer Software,
30 JuRiMErRIcs JouRNAL 15, 16 (1989) [hereinafter Last Frontier Conference]. For a
thorough discussion of the issues involved in the overlap and interface between patent
and copyright protection of user interfaces, see Symposium, Computer Programs: The
Patent/Copyright Interface, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 173 (1989-91).
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On the other hand, the presentation of a user interface
may have aesthetic purposes; it may differentiate one software
product from another with similar capabilities by providing dif-
ferent visuals or behavior. In addition, the user interface may
provide a "mood" for the software that entices a user to choose
a particular system or that makes the system appear easy to
use. 4 To the extent that user interface elements exhibit aes-
thetic expression, they should be protectable like other literary
and visual works.
The second difficulty in applying the substantial similarity
test to user interfaces, especially under Ninth Circuit case law,
is that the substantial similarity test has evolved to a point of
confusion.'5 Because of the divergent case law, it is no longer
obvious which elements the trier of fact may take into account
when determining substantial similarity. For example, several
recent decisions applying the substantial similarity test to fac-
tual and functional works have precluded the trier of fact from
examining anything other than the protected expression when
judging the works as a whole for similarity.'6 It is not clear
from these cases whether user interfaces should be treated like
functional works for this purpose.'7
In addition, as a result of the divergent case law, the
court's role in the substantial similarity test seems to have
changed. For example, recent Ninth Circuit decisions have
allowed courts to examine the similarity of expression between
works with the aid of expert testimony and detailed analysis
before submitting the issue to a trier of fact.'" Moreover, one
14. This latter concept is often referred to in the software industry as the "user-
friendliness" of software. The aesthetics are but one of the factors that determine
whether a piece of software is user-friendly. Other relevant factors include speed,
accuracy, simplicity of presentation and function, and intuitive sequence of responses
or requests.
15. See infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
16. McCulloch v. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987); Harper House v. Nelson,
Inc., 889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989), on remand, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11790 (C.D. Cal.
1991).
During the intrinsic test, in which the trier of fact examines the works as a whole
without the aid of expert testimony, the trier of fact is confined to look at the "total
concept and feel" of the protected expression, rather than to the whole work. See infra
notes 112-66 and accompanying text.
17. Nevertheless, user interfaces should be treated this way because their dual
functional and aesthetic nature will give rise to the same scope of protection concerns
present in cases involving factual and functional subject matter. See infra notes 157-61
and accompanying text.
18. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992); Shaw v.
Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990); see infra notes 66-111 and accompanying text.
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decision applied this new principle directly to user interface
software infringement and implied that this principle should
be applied to all subject matters.19
Thus, the Ninth Circuit case law has created confusion
about which aspects of the substantial similarity test apply to
which kind of subject matter. Moreover, these cases do not
comport with the original Ninth Circuit test laid down in Sid
& Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.2"
However, this Comment asserts that changes embraced by
these cases are necessary and desirable to promote the goals of
copyright law and advocates a more uniform test for achieving
more uniform results.
Towards that end, this Comment recommends how courts
should apply the substantial similarity analysis to user inter-
faces. Specifically, this Comment (1) delineates the state of the
law in the Ninth Circuit and explains how the recent changes
should be interpreted with respect to user interfaces; (2) estab-
lishes an analytic framework for evaluating proposed substan-
tial similarity tests through the enumeration of a set of goals
specific to user interfaces; and (3) uses this analytic framework
to evaluate and endorse a test that applies traditional copyright
doctrine in a logical and consistent manner.
To accomplish these objectives, the remainder of this Com-
ment is divided into four sections. Section II lays out the tradi-
tional substantial similarity test under Krofft and discusses
how the test has been modified by recent cases. This section
also addresses the possible application of these modifications to
user interfaces and describes a recent decision involving user
interfaces."' Because courts have sufficiently deviated from
the Krofft test, because the Ninth Circuit has recently
addressed the confusion with respect to user interfaces, and
because there is at least one user interface case currently
before the court, a rare opportunity exists for the Ninth Cir-
cuit to clarify the substantial similarity test in general, and as
it applies to user interfaces.22
19. See Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d. 1465.
20. 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977); see infra notes 41-65 and accompanying
text.
21. See Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d 1465.
22. The Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp. case, No. C-88-20149-VRW (N.D. Cal.),
is currently before the court. Part of the case reached final judgment in Apple
Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LExis 5986 (N.D. Cal. 1992). The
remainder is scheduled for trial.
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Section III of this Comment sets up an analytic framework
for evaluating any proposed revisions of the test. This section
lays out a set of goals that should be addressed by a substantial
similarity test from the user interface perspective. These goals
include the following: (1) promote standardization and compat-
ibility; (2) foster competition; (3) account for the dual func-
tional and aesthetic role; (4) enable fine differentiation where
limited protection is available; (5) provide useful guidelines to
developers and designers; (6) enable consistent application of
principles; and (7) enable fair resolutions.
Section IV then identifies and compares the approaches
that the Ninth Circuit could adopt. One approach consists of
tests that are peculiar to the subject matter protected. Some
recent changes in the law indicate a trend in this direction.
Another approach consists of tests that are sufficiently general
to encompass all subject matter. An example of this latter
approach is the "successive filtering method."2
Finally, Section V analyzes the successive filtering method
according to the analytic framework established in Section III.
This section also demonstrates the successive filtering
method's practicability by illustrating how it can be used to
analyze the alleged infringements in the Apple Computer v.
Microsoft Corp.24 case.
II. STATE OF CONFUSION: SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN THE
NINTH CIRCUIT
A. Proof of Infringement and the Krofft Test
To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove
ownership of a valid copyright and "copying"25 of the protected
expression by the defendant.26 Copying can be proven either
directly through evidence of actual copying, or indirectly
through circumstantial evidence of defendant's access to the
copyrighted work and substantial similarity between the
defendant's work and the copyrighted work.27 If the degree of
23. NIMMER ON CopymRGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[F][1]-[6].
24. Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
25. Copying, in this context, refers to infringement of any of the exclusive rights
that could be granted to a copyright owner, including: (1) reproduction; (2) adaptation
(preparing derivative works); (3) publication; (4) public performance; and (5) public
display. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
26. Shaw v. UIndheim, 908 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1990).
27. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
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similarity rises to the level of "striking similarity," access may
be inferred. 8
Within this general model, courts in different circuits have
diverged in their analyses of substantial similarity.' The anal-
yses differ as to the role of the court and the triers of fact, the
admissibility of expert testimony, and the appropriateness of
analytic dissection.3 ° Most tests for determining substantial
similarity have evolved from some variation of an ordinary
observer or "audience test." This test asks whether the sponta-
neous and immediate reaction of the lay observer or intended
audience would find the works to be the same,3' without the
28. Striking similarity may occur, for example, when intentional errors have been
placed in the copyrighted work and these appear in turn in the defendant's work with
no other possible explanation for their presence except from copying. See NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[C].
29. For a comprehensive analysis of the varying substantial similarity tests, see id.
§ 13.03[A][1]-[2]. Nimmer divides the world of copying into "comprehensive nonliteral
similarity" and "fragmented literal similarity." Id. The latter category covers
verbatim copying. Here, the similarity of ideas is a given fact and the main problem is
to determine whether the copying was sufficient to be considered substantial. In any
given case, the answer depends upon the quantitative and qualitative amount of the
material copied. Id. § 13.03[A][2].
Comprehensive nonliteral similarity, covers paraphrasing to the point of
plagiarism. Most of the substantial similarity tests focus on this problem. Here, it is
necessary to separate the ideas from the expression when comparing works because
copying that results in the similarity of ideas is allowed. Examples of such tests
include Judge Learned Hand's "abstractions test"; Professor Chafee's "pattern test";
and the Ninth Circuit's "extrinsic/intrinsic" test. Id. § 13.03[A][1][a]-[c]. In addition,
special tests have been developed for software development, such as the Uniden
iterative test, E.F. Johnson v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn 1985), and the
Whelan test, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at
§ 13.03[AI[l][d). The Uniden test confines the infringement analysis to literal copying
or translation, but recognizes that expert testimony is critical to the similarity analysis
involving computer programs. Id. The Whelan test extends copying protection to the
structure, sequence, and organization of a program and also relies on expert testimony.
Id. This test separates idea from expression by allowing a program's primary function
to define its sole idea and what remains is expression. The Second Circuit recently
renounced this test and adopted a test that combines Judge Learned Hand's
"abstractions test" with Nimmer's successive filtering test. Computer Associates
International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LExis 14305, at *18-20 (2d Cir. 1992).
30. Analytic dissection refers to the comparison of works by examining their
particular constituent elements instead of comparing the works as a whole using a
gestalt method. Dissection (analysis) can be used to separate the protectable
expression from the ideas or unprotectable expression. It can also be used to aid in
deciding what has been copied. Often, expert testimony is used both to perform the
dissection and to compare the similarities. See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531
(9th Cir. 1990).
31. Courts have been inconsistent as to whether the substantial similarity test
should use an ordinary observer standard or an intended audience standard.
MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 275 (1989). Given the highly
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aid of critical analysis or expert testimony.32
The Ninth Circuit uses a variation of the audience test
that is commonly known as the Krofft test or the "extrinsic/
intrinsic" test.33 It is based on the bifurcated approach devel-
oped in the Second Circuit in Arnstein v. Porter.3 4 Arnstein's
bifurcated approach addressed some shortcomings of the audi-
ence test by allowing a more critical objective analysis of the
works under comparison at one stage of the test. 5 Hence, the
Arnstein bifurcated approach separates the substantial
similarity analysis into two steps: copying and unlawful
appropriation.3 6
The Arnstein test first establishes, using expert testimony
and analytic dissection, whether there has been copying.37
Only then is the trier of fact required to judge, based solely on
a lay observer response, whether the copying is inappropri-
ate.38 However, Arnstein does not state what is compared dur-
ing each step to determine similarity.3 9 Instead, it focuses on
who is to judge each step and what kind of evidence is
allowed.40
Similar to Arnstein, the extrinsic/intrinsic test of Krofft
divides the analysis into two steps, but the steps are different.
technical nature of computer programs, the intended audience (user) of a computer
program would be in the best position to judge whether any differences between the
infringing and infringed software programs are relevant to their actual use. For
example, a lay observer judging the similarity of two word processing programs may
find that all word processing programs look the same because the observer does not
understand the range of differences of expression that can possibly exist in computer
programs. Furthermore, without the ability to use the software program, the lay
observer has no idea how to locate pertinent differences, such as how to locate the
different user dialogs available for a particular function.
32. NIMmER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[E][1].
33. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977).
34. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); see Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
35. The major problem with the audience test is that because it involves a visceral,
gestalt-type of response, a lay observer can perceive infringement when copying does
not exist. NIMmER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[E][2]. On the other hand,
the lay observer will more likely miss an instance of infringement when the works
involve implementations in different mediums. Id.
36. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69.
37. "The trier of facts must determine whether the similarities are sufficient to
prove copying. On this issue, analysis ('dissection') is relevant, and the testimony of
experts may be received .. " I& at 468.
38. Id. Inappropriate copying exists when "a defendant took from plaintiff's work
so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners ... that defendant wrongfully
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff." Id. at 473.
39. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
40. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69.
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In the first step of the Krofft test, the court analyzes the simi-
larity of ideas between the defendant's work and the copy-
righted work.41 If the ideas are similar, the second step calls
for an evaluation of the similarity of the expression of these
ideas.42 The first step is generally referred to as the extrinsic
test because "it depends not on the responses of the trier of
fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and ana-
lyzed."43 Analytic dissection (analysis of these criteria) and
expert testimony are appropriate at this stage." The second
step is generally referred to as the intrinsic test because it
depends on "the response of the ordinary reasonable person."45
Analytic dissection and expert testimony are inappropriate
here.46
Recent developments in Ninth Circuit law arise from two
problems related to Krofft and Arnstein. The first problem is
found in the first step of the two tests. Unlike Arnstein, Krofft
only examines the work's ideas in the first step and then
leaves the entire expression analysis to the trier of fact.47





46. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. One recent change allows analytic dissection in the
intrinsic part of the test when necessary to separate protected from unprotected
expression. See infra notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
47. Although Krofft claims to have based its test upon Arnstein, the Krofft
interpretation of Arnstein is not logically compelled. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165.
Specifically, it is not necessary to read Arnatein' first step of "copying" (which is not
of itself infringement) as restricted to the copying "merely of the work's idea," as the
Krofft analysis claims. Id. As the Krofft opinion states, "when the court in Arnstein
refers to 'copying' which is not itself an infringement, it must be suggesting copying
merely of the work's idea, which is not protected by the copyright." Id. (emphasis
added). The court goes on to say that it is attempting to clarify the issues involved. Id.
However, other elements of a work may be copied permissibly. For example, copying
expression is permissible if the expression has merged with the idea, or if it is
unprotected stock treatment as limited by the scenes a faire doctrine, or if it has been
given limited protection under some other doctrine. See supra note 7 for a discussion
of the merger and scenes a faire doctrines. Another possible doctrine that could limit
the protectability of expression is "fair use," codified in the 1976 Copyright Act. 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1976). Fair use permits copying under certain circumstances, such as for
research and education purposes, taking into account factors intended to balance the
parties' interests. Id.
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supports the position that the Arnstein test did not dictate
Krofft's logic. Nimmer argues that the cases cited in Arnstein for illustrating
permissible copying show that the Arnstein "copying" step requires a determination of
the similarity of expression, regardless of the protectabiity of such expression.
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[E][3].
The Krofft court was careful not to predicate its result on a proper analysis of
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Thus, the court has a reduced role in what it can examine as a
matter of law.4" Krofft's elimination of any evaluation of
expression in the first part of the test (using expert testimony
and analytic dissection) is precisely one of the problems sought
to be overcome by the newer Ninth Circuit tests.4 9 The newer
tests allow courts to analyze similarity of expression with the
aid of expert testimony and dissection.
The second problem is found in the second part of the two
tests. Neither test addresses whether the second step (the vis-
ceral audience response) is confined to an examination of pro-
tectable expression,' and neither opinion instructs a court on
how to perform this analysis. 51 Again, recent decisions in the
Arnatein. The Krofft court specifically stated that it "believe[s] that the Arnstein
court was doing nearly the same thing. But the fact that it may not have been does not
detract from our analysis." Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165 n.7. After all, Arnatein was not
binding precedent, and the Krofft court was attempting to clarify the practical
application of the idea/expression principles. Id. at 1165.
48. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[E][3]. Theoretically, most suits
for infringement will involve similar ideas; otherwise, the parties would not have
brought suit. Therefore, most of the issues will be left for the trier of fact in the
audience test (step 2) of the analysis. Id. Also, in summary judgment motions, the
plaintiff will have less to prove in the Krofft test than in the Arnstein test because the
plaintiff need only demonstrate a genuine issue regarding similarity of ideas; whereas
in Arnstein, assuming one does not accept Krofft's interpretation, the plaintiff needs to
demonstrate genuine issues regarding similarity of ideas and expression. See Arnstein,
154 F.2d 464.
However, Ninth Circuit decisions have not strictly adhered to this reduced role of
the court. Although most decisions examining summary judgment state that summary
judgment on issues of substantial similarity is not favored, they state that it is
appropriate when the court can conclude that "no reasonable juror could find
substantial similarity of ideas and expression." See, e.g., Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d
907, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1989). Many Ninth Circuit decisions have affirmed summary
judgment, implying that the court does not believe its role should be so restrained.
See, e.g., Narell, 872 F.2d 907; Aliotti v. Dakin, 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987); Berkic v.
Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Litchfield v.
Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
49. See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990), which adds the
objective analysis of expression to the first part of the test in the case of literary
works. See also infra notes 66-111 and accompanying text.
50. Nimmer believes that Arnatein meant to restrict the intrinsic test to
protectable expression, although no explicit reason is given. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 6, at § 13.03[E][3].
In the Ninth Circuit, the intrinsic test is also known as the "total concept and
feel" test, which might imply that any dissection or separation into protectable and
unprotectable parts is inappropriate. Litckfield referred to the test as involving an
analysis of the total concept and feel citing Krofft; however, Krofft made no use of
this term. Litchfield, 736 F.2d. at 1357.
51. For example, should a court allow the trier of fact to determine what is
protectable expression without expert aid or analysis or should the court allow use of
expert testimony confined to this purpose?
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Ninth Circuit have sought to address these two problems.52
B. Recent Trends and Confusion with the Substantial
Similarity Test
Judge Walker, in a preliminary ruling in Apple Computer
v. Microsoft Corp., alluded to the confusion in the Ninth Cir-
cuit copyright law when he expressed concern that the law was
suggesting "that elements of [a copyrighted work] found to be
'unprotectible' must be eliminated from consideration in the
substantial similarity of expression analysis." 3 He went on to
question whether this method of analysis is correct.' If cor-
rect, he said, it would prohibit a finding of substantial similar-
ity in cases like compilations, which involve a creative selection
and arrangement of unprotectable components: because
unprotectable components would all be removed from the
analysis beforehand, no substantial similarity could be found.55
Judge Walker astutely noticed that the law, at least in cer-
tain subject matter areas, is implicitly moving towards remov-
ing unprotected elements from the intrinsic step of substantial
similarity analysis, even though the cases have not all explic-
itly stated this proposition.' His reasoning should be taken
one step further: If unprotected elements are to be removed
from the intrinsic analysis, then they should be examined and
sifted out in the extrinsic step. This method would enable the
trier of fact to identify protectable expression with the aid of
expert testimony and dissection. Several recent cases have
allowed analytic dissection for this purpose,57 but they have
not clarified whether the dissection took place in the intrinsic
or extrinsic step.'
52. See, e.g., Cooling Systems and Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485,
493 (9th Cir. 1985) (restricting the intrinsic test for factual works by limiting the total
concept and feel language to protectable expression). See infra notes 121-27 and
accompanying text.
53. Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 779 F.Supp 133, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(order granting motion for reconsideration) (emphasis supplied).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 136.
56. See, e.g., Cooling Systems, 777 F.2d at 493, in which this method was first used
with factual works. But see McCulloch v. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 321 (9th Cir. 1987),
which limited the Cooling Systems holding to non-artistic works.
57. See, e.g., Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988);
Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988); Aliotti v. Dakin &
Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987).
58. See, e.g., Data East, which eliminated all of the similar expression as
unprotectable due to merger in the intrinsic analysis. 862 F.2d at 208. However, the
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However, for two reasons, Judge Walker is incorrect in
implying that this change is necessarily detrimental to the sim-
ilarity of expression analysis of works whose sole creative
expression lies in their selection or arrangement, such as com-
pilations. First, a plaintiff submitting a case on infringement
of such a work should submit the arrangement or selection
itself as an infringed element, rather than the underlying
unprotected elements comprising the arrangement. 59  Then,
after the unprotected elements are removed through dissec-
tion, the arrangement or selection element will remain on the
list of infringed elements.'
Second, the court now allows analytic dissection for the
purpose of determining whether the similarities of expression
result from unprotectable expression. Thus, the arrangement
element on the list of infringements will not accidently disap-
pear as a result of dissection even though unprotected compo-
nent items are removed.
Judge Walker's allusion is only the tip of the iceberg.
Analysis of recent Ninth Circuit case law demonstrates a
marked split between the treatment of factual or functional
works and fictional or artistic works. Also, recent modifica-
tions of the substantial similarity test represent substantial
diversions from the Krofft test. These modifications imply sev-
eral new principles: (1) the extrinsic test should be expanded
to include analysis of similarity of expression and not just simi-
larity of ideas;6' (2) the intrinsic test should be confined to a
court in Brown Bag interprets this section of the Data East opinion as outside of the
substantial similarity analysis and part of a scope of protection analysis. Brown Bag
Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1992); see infra note 150.
See also Olson, 855 F.2d at 1453, which referred to the analytic dissection it had
performed in the extrinsic test when concluding that no substantial similarity existed
in the intrinsic test because all similarity arose from "unprotect[a]ble scenes a faire."
59. This list of infringements could be submitted at the pleading stage or on a
summary judgment motion after discovery.
60. This reasoning assumes that the plaintiff's list is used as the basis for the
analytic dissection. If not, then the court should make sure that the arrangement and
selection is a component in the dissection. Also, if the arrangement and selection of
unprotectable items remains on the list, the court would need to instruct the trier of
fact to restrict similarity analysis to the arrangement and not to compare the
underlying unprotected matter. In practice, this may be difficult. See, e.g., Harper
House v. Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989), in which jury instructions were not
considered sufficient to differentiate between protected and unprotected analysis. In
Harper House, the jury's intrinsic "total concept and feel" test should have been
limited to protectable expression. Id.
61. See, e.g., Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d 1465; Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531
(9th Cir. 1990).
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comparison of protectable expression for factual works,6 2 func-
tional works, 3 video games,64 and other works whose scope of
copyright protection is limited; and (3) analytic dissection
should be used to separate the protected from the unprotected
expression.6 5 The development of each of these principles is
discussed in turn.
1. Expansion of the Extrinsic Test
The expansion of the extrinsic test to include expression is
the primary contribution of a series of cases that began in the
Ninth Circuit with the district court opinion in Jason v.
Fonda,' which was later advocated by the Court of Appeals in
Litchfield v. Spielberg," and further expanded in Brown Bag
Software v. Symantec.68 This expansion of the extrinsic test
has resulted in an increased role of the court, especially in its
ability to grant summary judgment motions.
Jason v. Fonda involved a claim by the author of a book
entitled "Concomitant Soldier-Woman and War," against the
writers and producers of the motion picture "Coming Home."69
In an appeal against summary judgment for the defendant, the
Jason court was the first to describe a set of specific criteria
that could be listed and analyzed for written works, as
required by the Krofft extrinsic test.70 The criteria were "plot,
themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, and sequence."'" The
opinion did not examine these criteria in detail; rather, the
court described the general subject of the two works as involv-
ing unprotectable ideas such as morality and the effects of war
62. See, e.g., Cooling Systems and Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator, Inc, 777 F.2d 485
(9th Cir. 1985).
63. See, e.g., Harper House, 889 F.2d 197.
64. See, e.g., Data East, 862 F.2d 204.
65. See, e.g., Aliotti v. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
66. 526 F. Supp 774 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982).
67. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
68. 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir.
1989); Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988); McCulloch v.
Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.
1985).
69. Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp 774 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affl'd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir.
1982).
70. The Krofft test listed criteria such as "the type of artwork involved, the
materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the subject." Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
Arguably, these criteria are more general and abstract than recently posed criteria.
71. Jason, 526 F. Supp. at 777.
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on women and injured veterans.72 The court stated, however,
that it found the movie and book to have substantial differ-
ences in "contexts, characters, and language.
73
Litchfield v. Spielberg74 and Berkic v. Crichton7" applied
the same extrinsic test to movies and screen treatments.7 In
Litchfield, the plaintiff accused Steven Spielberg of copying
her musical play called "Lokey from Maldemar" in his movie
"E.T. ''7 7 The court explicitly invoked the Jason test, stating
that "[s]imilarity of ideas may be shown by an extrinsic test
which focuses on alleged similarities in the objective details of
the works. The extrinsic test requires a comparison of plot,
theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, and sequence. '7' The
court then performed the extrinsic analysis and concluded that
even though some similarity existed in the opening scenes, no
substantial similarity existed between "the sequences of
events, mood, dialogue, and characters of the two works."79
The court also concluded that any plot similarities were unpro-
tectable because they existed at a very general level.8"
In Berkic, another movie infringement case, the court used
the Jason test and expanded its language. In Berkic, the plain-
tiff accused Michael Crichton and others of basing the book
and movie "Coma" on a screen treatment called "Reincarna-
tion, Inc.," which the plaintiff had submitted for review to a
studio.8 1 The defendants did not deny access to the screen
treatment, but claimed that "Coma" was, as a matter of law,
not substantially similar to "Reincarnation, Inc. '8 2 In review-
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
75. 761 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1985).
76. Like Jason, both cases involved appeals of summary judgment orders for the
defendants.
77. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1354.
78. Id. at 1356 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The change in the extrinsic
test to the objective/subjective language of Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531 (9th Cir.
1990), took place as early as the Litczfield opinion. Neither the Krofft opinion nor
Jason used the phrase "similarities in the objective details," even though it was cited in
Litchfield as coming from Krofft. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1356. Krofft simply referred
to "specific criteria" and gave examples. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). Jason quoted Krofft verbatim.
Jason, 526 F. Supp at 777.
79. The court did not describe the details of this analysis. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at
1356-57.
80. Id. at 1357.
81. Berkic v. Chrichton, 761 F.2d at 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1985).
82. Id. at 1292.
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ing the two works, the Berkic court cited the extrinsic test as
stated in both Litchfield and Jason.13 The court further stated
that the substantial similarity of ideas test "compares, not the
basic plot ideas for stories, but the actual concrete elements
that make up the total sequence of events and the relationships
between the major characters."" In finding that the works
were not similar, the court compared some of the sequences of
events, the settings, and the major romantic relationship.8
The court found that any similarities that did exist resulted
from unprotectable stock scenes or incidents flowing from the
choice of a particular plot or ideas."
Unlike Jason, Litchfield, and Berkic, the court in McCul-
loch v. Price7 applied the Litchfield language of the extrinsic
test to an artistic work."8 McCulloch involved the copying of a
red decorative plate with a floral design and the words "You
Are Special Today" in white lettering, to be used to "honor
someone at dinner."8 9 The defendant company produced a
white plate with red lettering bearing the same phrase and
containing a floral design.'
In judging the similarity of the works in the extrinsic test,
the McCulloch court summarily stated that Litchfield could be
read as saying that similarity of ideas "may be shown by focus-
ing on the similarities in the objective details of the works."'"
The McCulloch court then found that the district court's find-
ing of fact that the two works were "confusingly similar in
appearance" was sufficient to satisfy the substantial similarity
of ideas.92 To draw this inference, the appellate court must
have presumed that the district court examined the objective
83. See supra notes 70-71, 78 and accompanying text.
84. Berkic, 761 F.2d at 1293 (emphasis added). For comparison, the court's
statement of the intrinsic test is the similarity of " 'the mood evoked.., as a whole'...
and in the 'total concept and feel of the works." Id. at 1294 (citations omitted). The
intrinsic analysis is conclusory and provided in one statement: "We are confident that
no reasonable reader or moviegoer would recognize . . .Coma as a 'picturization' or
'dramatization' of Reincarnation." Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1293-94.
87. 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987).
88. The Litchfield test parallels the Jason test but adds language that refers to the
analysis of the similarities of objective details. See supra note 78 and accompanying
text. Most courts after Litchfield and Berkic cite those cases for the test language.
See, e.g., Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989).
89. McCulloch, 823 F.2d at 318.
90. Id.




details of the works. Because the comparison was not recorded
in the opinion, one cannot tell what the McCulloch court sub-
stituted for the Jason test of "plot, theme, dialogue, mood, set-
ting, pace, and sequence."'  However, any comparison of
appearance would probably involve elements of expression and
not just ideas.
In Narell v. Freeman,' the court added characters to the
list of objective criteria to be analyzed in the extrinsic test and
changed "sequence" to "sequence of events."95 In Narell, the
author of a primarily non-fiction, mass biography book entitled
"Our City: The Jews of San Francisco," brought an infringe-
ment claim against the author of fictional romance novel enti-
tled "Illusions of Love."' The actual extrinsic analysis in the
Narell opinion is not particularly elucidating.9 7  The court
focused on plot and theme oriented comparisons such as the
book types (historical versus romantic) and the history of the
Jews common to both books.9 The court concluded that the
works were dissimilar in terms of mood, pace, and sequence.9
Finally, in Shaw v. Lindheim,1°° the court asserted that
the above line of cases had reformulated the Krofft extrinsic
test into an objective test of the similarity of expression,
instead of a test of the similarity of ideas. The court stated:
Now that it includes virtually every element that may be
93. Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1981), qff'd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir.
1982).
94. 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989).
95. Id. at 912 (citing Berkic v. Chrichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985)); Shaw
v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1990).
Approximately sixth months before the Narell decision, the court, in Olson v.
National Broadcasting Co., applied the Litchfield objective elements extrinsic test to a
comparison between a television series called the "A-Team" and a screen treatment
for a T.V. pilot called "Cargo." 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988). The opinion provides a
helpful example of analyzing the various elements including the plot, theme, mood,
pace, and characters. However, the opinion did not add anything to the legal analysis
of the test.
96. Narell, 872 F.2d at 909.
97. The entire part of the opinion pertaining to the substantial similarity analysis
is arguably dicta. The court itself stated that summary judgment was appropriate
because no protected expression had been copied based upon Narell's list of copied
passages. Id. at 912. Indeed, this stance is supported by Justice Halls' special
concurrence: "Because I conclude that no protected expression was copied.... the
district court properly granted summary judgment .... In my view, this conclusion
ends the analysis . . . . It becomes unnecessary to reach the issue[] of substantial
similarity .... Id. at 915.
98. Id. at 912.
99. Id. at 913.
100. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1990).
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considered concrete in a literary work, the extrinsic test as
applied to books, scripts, plays, and motion pictures can no
longer be seen as a test for mere similarity of ideas .... The
two tests are more sensibly described as objective and sub-
jective analyses of expression, having strayed from Krofft's
division between expression and ideas.... Indeed, a judicial
determination under the intrinsic test is now virtually
devoid of analysis .... [It] has become a mere subjective
judgment as to whether two literary works are . .
similar.1
0 1
The Shaw court's task was to review a summary judgment
motion made against the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged an
infringement of his pilot script "The Equalizer" by a television
series treatment also entitled "The Equalizer." ' The court,
following Jason and its progeny, analyzed the themes, plots,
characters, and some dialogue of both works and decided that
"reasonable minds might differ as to the substantial similarity
between the protected ideas of the respective works."' '
Therefore, the court held that summary judgment was inap-
propriate and announced a new rule for literary works: If a
plaintiff can satisfy the extrinsic test by showing that there is a
genuine issue of fact with respect to the objective elements of
expression, then a court may not grant summary judgment. 1° 4
Otherwise, a court would substitute its own subjective analysis
for that of the trier of fact. 05
101. Id. at 535 (emphasis added except to the word "expression").
102. Id. at 533.
103. Id. at 536.
104. Id. at 537.
Note the use of the word "ideas" in italics in the summary judgment holding.
Shaw, 908 F.2d at 537. See infra note 110. First, the statement may be meant to
support the court's belief that the extrinsic test is one of similarity of expression, given
that ideas are not protectable. The court here, arguably, meant to include objective
expression, which is protectable, in the term "ideas." Second, stating the summary
judgment holding in this manner encompasses cases that might appear to contradict
the Shaw rule. For example, Aliotti and its progeny, which involve summary
judgment and the merger doctrine, could also be covered. See infra notes 131-52 and
accompanying text. Summary judgment is appropriate in these cases, even though the
extrinsic test may be satisfied due to the similarity of ideas, because no substantial
similarity in the intrinsic test can be found as a matter of law when all the similarity is
due to unprotectable expression that has merged with the idea(s). See, e.g., Aliotti v.
Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). If the summary judgment extrinsic test is
restated as protected "ideas," then these type of cases would instead fail the extrinsic
test because no protected ideas are present. Then, a court could grant summary
judgment because these scenarios would not contradict the Shaw summary judgment
rule.
105. Shaw, 908 F.2d at 536. The court's reasoning is based on its repartitioning of
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Shaw has interesting ramifications to user interfaces
because they are typically protected as literary works.
Although software is not specifically included in the Shaw
court's analysis, and user interfaces do not have plots, themes,
and characters, a Shaw-type analysis might still be useful
because user interfaces do have objective elements of expres-
sion. For example, the sequence of dialogs presented to a user,
the colors used in the graphical components, the means to
input data to the program, and the function names chosen are
all objective elements of expression that can be analyzed
individually."°
A recent Ninth Circuit case addressing user interfaces
took this view. In Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp.,"0 7
the plaintiff appealed a summary judgment on the substantial
similarity of two computer outlining programs. The plaintiff
alleged infringement of its program, claiming similarity of the
opening display screens, pulldown menus, color schemes, and
other features.'0 8 The court affirmed the district court's exam-
ination of the objective elements of expression and acknowl-
edged that the extrinsic test had been reformulated into an
objective test of expression for user interfaces."° The opinion
carefully avoided restricting the objective expression test to lit-
erary works, as in Shaw,"0 implying that the new test applies
the test into objective and subjective steps. See id. at 536-37. If a court analyzes the
objective expression, determines that a genuine issue of material fact exists, and grants
summary judgment, it would be saying that its own subjective analysis had more
weight than an objective analysis. See id.
106. This Author does not imply that these particular objective elements are or
should be protectable or that this is the correct approach for analyzing substantial
similarity in user interfaces.
107. 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992).
108. Id. at 1472-73.
109. Id. at 1475.
110. Arguably, Brown Bag did not resolve the issue of whether the Shaw summary
judgment holding applies solely to literary works. The Brown Bag court ruled that the
Shaw summary judgment holding does apply to user interfaces, stating that "we
cannot conclude as a matter of law that the programs at issue here, or computer
programs in general, are so nonliterary or so limited in their variety of expression as
to avoid application of the rule announced in Shaw." Id. at 1476. However, the court
did not decide the larger issue.
On the other hand, Pasillas v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991),
stated that Shaw's holding regarding the summary judgment test is to be restricted to
literary works, as opposed to artistic works. The only issue before the Pasillas court
was whether, after Shaw, a court can grant summary judgment based upon the
intrinsic test. Because it addressed a case of merger, the Pasillas court differentiated
Shaw and stated that it could grant summary judgment because there was no way the
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to all subject matter."'
In summary, Jason, Litchfield, Berkic, Narell, and Shaw
extended the extrinsic analysis of traditional literary works to
include "objective elements of expression" such as plot, theme,
characters, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, and sequence of
events. In addition, McCulloch applied a similar test to artistic
works. Shaw went even further and established a rule for
summary judgment, stating that it is inappropriate, after per-
forming an objective analysis of expression, to grant summary
judgment if genuine issues of material fact remain. Shaw also
re-characterized the entire substantial similarity test as objec-
tive and subjective analyses of expression. Lastly, Brown Bag
Software stated that the reformulated test applies to all subject
matters. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has reformulated the extrin-
sic test and expanded its role in deciding infringement cases.
2. Confining the Intrinsic Test to Protectable Expression
The second new principle, limiting the intrinsic test com-
parison to protectable expression, appears to be a trend in
recent Ninth Circuit cases." 2 This principle ensures that the
trier of fact may use the intrinsic test to fairly conclude that a
work has been impermissibly copied."3 Otherwise, a trier of
fact could be influenced by the similarity of elements that the
law permits to be copied and could gain an overall impression
that a work has been impermissibly copied even though no
protected elements were actually copied.1 4 A wrong overall
impression of similarity could occur, for example, because the
expression necessarily follows from the choice of an idea or is
limited by the number of ways available to express the idea.
As a result, the two works look almost identical even though
intrinsic test could ever succeed based upon unprotectable expression. Id. at 443. But
see supra note 104, which suggests that this differentiation was not necessary.
111. "Recently . . . we have recognized that the line is more properly drawn
between objective and subjective analyses of expression .... Moday, however, the
extrinsic test looks at more than just the similarity of ideas .... [It] has become an
'objective . . . analysfis] of expression."' Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d at 1474-75
(quoting Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357 (emphasis in original)).
112. Cases that seem to support this principle typically state that the substantial
similarity test requires the plaintiff to prove the "similarity of general ideas" under
the extrinsic test and the "similarity of protected expression" under the intrinsic test.
See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Olson v. National
Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1988); Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Prods. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977)).
113. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[E][2].
114. Id. § 13.03[E][1].
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the copying is permitted.115
The Ninth Circuit has advocated limiting the intrinsic test
to protectable expression when a particular type of work has
acquired limited copyright protection. Thus, the Ninth Circuit
has applied this principle to factual works," 6 functional
works," 7 video games,"" and works whose expression is
granted little protection because of the merger or scenes a
faire doctrines." 9 User interfaces should be treated similarly
due to their functional nature; however, in a recent case, the
court refused to rule on this issue.
1 20
The first case to limit the intrinsic test to protectable
expression was Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart
Radiator, Inc.12' This case involved an infringement action
between two distributors of illustrated radiator catalogs. Both
works were factual works arranged into the same three sec-
tions: an illustrations section, an original equipment manufac-
turer section, and an applications section.122  The Cooling
Systems court recognized the need to treat factual works dif-
ferently from more artistic works because of the limited range
of expression available to factual works. 123 The court affirmed
summary judgment against the plaintiff and applied the princi-
ple announced in Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Play-
ers, Inc.'"4 that "similarity of expression [might] have to
amount to verbatim reproduction.., before a factual work will
be deemed infringed."'1 25 Thus, in applying the intrinsic test, it
115. See injfra note 167 for a specific software example of the merger doctrine.
116. See, e.g., Cooling Systems and Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485
(9th Cir. 1985).
117. See, e.g., Harper House v. Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989).
118. See, e.g., Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
119. See, e.g., Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988);
Aliotti v. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
120. See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
Recently, however, the court for the Northern District of California applied this
principle in the user interface case of Apple v. Microsoft, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12219
(N.D. Cal. 1992). Judge Walker cited Pasilas v. McDonalds Corp., 927 F.2d 440 (9th
Cir. 1991), to state that the intrinsic test "entails a comparison of the portions of a
work that can be the subject of copyright protection." Apple, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12219, at *18. He then applied the limiting doctrines, such as merger and scenes a
faire, to analyze whether the expression found similar under the extrinsic test was
protected and thus able to survive summary judgment. Id. at *21-26.
121. 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985).
122. Id. at 492.
123. Id. at 491.
124. 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984).
125. Cooling Systems, 777 F.2d at 491 (citing Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword
Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984)).
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is insufficient to look at the similarity of the whole work
because a lay observer could easily find the two works similar
as a whole.126 Significantly, such a result would not necessarily
amount to verbatim copying as required. Instead, the lay
observer must examine "whether the very small amount of
protectible [sic] expression... is substantially similar .... ,127
Within two years, McCulloch v. Price severely limited this
principle, holding it inapplicable to literary works. 128  Like
Cooling Systems, the McCulloch opinion cited Landsberg, but
this time it lent support to the opposite principle: a non-fac-
tual work should receive much broader protection because of
the variety of expression available to implement ideas.12 The
McCulloch court stated that the intrinsic test should require
"the work be considered as a whole, including any elements
which may not be independently copyrightable apart from the
work."130
Retreating from the harsh stance of McCulloch, a series of
cases beginning with Aliotti v. Dakin & Co. 3 ' impliedly
restored the principle of limiting the intrinsic test to protect-
able expression in works, regardless of subject matter, where
the doctrines of merger or scenes a faire limit available protec-
tion. Where all the similarities between two works are deemed
unprotectable due to merger or scenes a faire, the court will
not permit any substantial similarity to be found in the intrin-
sic test as a matter of law. 32 Thus, any lay observer analysis
in the intrinsic test of the "total concept and feel," which by
definition includes unprotectable expression, becomes pointless
after the court has determined that it will not permit a finding
of substantial similarity of expression.113  This result is consis-
tent with the Landsberg principle that the less protectable a
work, the more a court requires verbatim copying to constitute
126. See id. at 493.
127. Id.
128. McCulloch v. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 87-93
and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of McCulloch.
129. Id. at 321 (citing Landsberg).
130. Id.
131. 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
132. Id. at 901. The court stated that "no substantial similarity may be found
under the intrinsic test where analytic dissection demonstrates that all similarities in
expression arise from the use of common ideas." Id.
133. For this reason, the Shaw court later recognized that in this type of merger
case, as differentiated from literary works, a court is "well-suited to make the required
determination of similarity on a motion for summary judgment." Shaw v. Lindheim,




The Aliotti case illustrates the principle that if all similari-
ties are found to be unprotectable through merger or scenes a
faire, no substantial similarity can be found as a matter of
law.13 Specifically, Aliotti involved the alleged infringement
of a line of stuffed animal dinosaurs by allegedly similar toy
dinosaurs. 13' Although the court determined that the ideas
encompassed by the two works were identical "stuffed dino-
saur toys," it found that all of the similarities of expression
between the two lines of toys necessarily followed from the
idea of a stuffed dinosaur toy.1 37 For example, both product
lines consisted of animals that were "gentle and cuddly," and
because toys intended for children "are usually designed to be
soft and nonthreatening," this expression would obviously fol-
low to accomplish that result."s Thus, because all similarities
resulted from merged expression or standard treatments of the
idea of stuffed dinosaurs, the court found that there was "no
substantial similarity of protectable expression."139
Following Aliotti, several cases involving the merger of
idea and expression and the scenes a faire doctrine applied the
Aliotti doctrine to different subject matter. These cases
include Olson v. National Broadcasting Co. 140 and Data East
USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc. 41 First, in Olson, the court affirmed a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict order against the plain-
tiff in a case involving infringement of a screenplay and treat-
ment for a television pilot called "Cargo."' 42 The Olson court
first examined the allegedly infringing work, a television series
called "The A-Team," for similarity of the objective details of
the works in the extrinsic test. 43 After concluding that the
works lacked plot similarity, the court decided that any simi-
larities due to the theme, mood, and pace of the works were
expression that followed from the genre of action-adventure
134. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
135. Aliotti v. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
136. Id. at 900.
137. Id. at 900-01.
138. Id. at 901. In addition, that "Aliotti's Pterodactyl and Dakin's Peranodon
were designed as mobiles [does not support substantial similarity] given that each was
a winged creature." Id. at 901-02 n.1.
139. Id. at 902.
140. 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).
141. 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
142. Olson, 855 F.2d at 1452.
143. Id. at 1450.
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television series.'" Therefore, the similarities of expression
resulted from unprotectable elements and did not "demon-
strate substantial similarity."' 45 As a result, the court found
that the works were "not substantially similar under the
extrinsic test."''
Finally, applying the intrinsic test, the Olson court used
the Aliotti doctrine to find that "no substantial similarity of
protectable expression [exists] under the intrinsic test."'1 47
Even though a "reasonable jury" might have found substantial
similarity under the lay observer standard, the fact that all of
the similarities resulted from unprotectable scenes a faire was
sufficient to determine that no substantial similarity could be
found.' 4"
A second Ninth Circuit case, Data East, applied the Aliotti
doctrine to video games.149 The Data East court determined in
the intrinsic test that all of the similarities of expression found
were unprotectable due to the merger or scenes a faire doc-
trines." ° For example, "the game procedure, the common
karate moves .... a referee, computer graphics. ... result from
either constraints inherent in the sport of karate or computer
restraints . . . [and] are not protectable.' 15' Therefore, the
court ruled that there was no "protectable substantial
similarity."'
1 52
One year after Data East, the Cooling Systems principle of
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1451. The court also decided that because the characters in "Cargo"
were not protectable, a "claim of substantial similarity [could not be] based upon [the]
similarities in characters." Id. at 1451-53. Although characters are sometimes
protectable, the Olson court deemed the characters in "Cargo" too "thinly" described
to merit protection. Id. at 1453.
146. Olson, 855 F.2d at 1453.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Data East USA Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
150. Id. at 209.
The Ninth Circuit recently interpreted the Data East analysis of the protectability
of the similarities of expression found in the extrinsic test as a separate analysis of the
scope of protection of the copyright rather than as part of the intrinsic test. Brown
Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1992). However, the
text of the Data East opinion, arguably, placed this analysis in the intrinsic test. See
Data East, 862 F.2d at 208. The discrepancy is probably due to Brown Bag's
incorporation of Data East into a model based upon the reformulated extrinsic test,
whereas in Data East all analysis of expression was performed outside of the extrinsic
test.
151. Data East, 862 F.2d at 209.
152. Id.
[Vol. 16:319
1992] Substantial Similarity Law 343
restricting the intrinsic test to protectable expression was
invoked again, without the requirement of merger or scenes a
faire, upon a functional and factual work.15 3 In Harper House
v. Nelson, Inc., the court remanded to decide the infringement
of a time management organizer because the jury instructions
did not adequately instruct the jury how to compare the works
as wholes in the intrinsic test.154 Specifically, the instructions
needed to instruct the jury to focus only on the protectable
expression contained in the text of the organizer or the
arrangement of the compilation.155 The court found that Cool-
ing Systems limited the total impact and effect test to a com-
parison of protectable expression where the work, as in the
organizer, contained little that could be protected.'6
Because their functional nature is similar to the time
organizers in Harper and the video games in Data East, user
interfaces ought to be subject to the Cooling Systems'
restricted intrinsic test. However, in Brown Bag Software v.
Symantec, the court refused to decide this issue. 5 7 Although
the district court performed analytic dissection of the similari-
ties of expression between the two user interfaces and found
them to result from unprotectable expression,"S the Ninth
Circuit characterized this analysis as part of the copyright own-
ership analysis for the purpose of defining the scope of the
153. See Cooling Systems & Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485 (9th
Cir. 1985).
154. Harper House v. Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 207-08 (9th Cir. 1989).
155. Id. at 206. Although an instruction had been given that correctly required the
plaintiff to "make a showing of substantial similarity between 'protectable expression'
in the organizers," the court stated that the instruction was inadequate because it did
not tell the jury how to differentiate protectable from unprotectable expression. Id. at
207.
156. Id. at 207.
157. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992). See
supra notes 107-08 and associated text for a description of the case.
158. After the district court determined that the idea of using an opening menu
was similar (in the extrinsic test), it determined that the only similarity of expression
of these menus was in their use of the same functions (in what appears as the intrinsic
test). Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec, 1990 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,514, at
23,088 (N.D. Cal. 1989). Because these functions were then found inherent in the idea
of using an opening menu, the court found that "the expression of the two screens
(was] not substantially similar, as a matter of law." Id. This statement implies that
there were no similarities found in the intrinsic test that were protectable expression.
Finally, the court in its summary implied that it used the Alitti limitations, describing
the process of evaluating the opening screen similarities as "redacting that material
which is not protected under the copyright [and performing] the required extrinsic and
intrinsic tests." Id. at 23,089.
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plaintiff's copyright." 9 In a footnote, the court hedged in stat-
ing the effect this analysis might have on the intrinsic test.' 6°
Specifically, because the district court was not required to per-
form the intrinsic analysis in order to rule on summary judg-
ment, it was not necessary for the court of appeals to resolve
the issue. 6'
In summary, Cooling Systems established the principle
that for a factual work the intrinsic test should be limited to a
consideration of protectable expression. 162 This holding was
based on the belief that the less protectable a work, the more a
court should require verbatim copying before finding infringe-
ment.16 3  After McCulloch attempted to limit Cooling Systems
to factual works, a series of cases beginning with Aliotti
impliedly reintroduced the Cooling Systems' principle, at least
where merger or scenes a faire limits available expression."
As a result, the intrinsic test has been limited to protectable
expression in cases involving factual works, functional works,
video games, and works whose scope of copyright protection
appears limited.16  Finally, although the intrinsic test ought to
be similarly limited when applied to user interfaces, Brown
159. Brown Bag, 960 F.2d at 1475-76.
160. "The degree to which unprotected or unprotectable features must be
eliminated from a comparison of two works is difficult to say." Id. at 1476 n.4.
Apparently, the word "comparison" refers to the intrinsic test because the text cites to
a discussion in NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT concerning the intrinsic test. Id. See NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[E][1].
Contrary to Brown Bag, Judge Walker in a recent Apple Computer v. Microsoft
Corp. order explicitly eliminated unprotectable features from the intrinsic test. 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12219, *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 1992). See supra note 119.
161. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment based on a finding
that no similarity of "copyrighted components" resulted from application of the
extrinsic test. Brown Bag, 960 F.2d at 1477. Arguably, the court of appeals
recharacterized the district court's analysis to coincide better with the reformulated
Krofft test, which was not considered by the district court. Thus, the appellate court
placed the analysis of expression that would have been considered part of the intrinsic
test by the district court into the extrinsic test. Because the district court never
performed a subjective analysis of the total concept and feel under Aliotti (no
protectable similarities remained), none of the district court analysis remains as part of
the intrinsic analysis in the court of appeals opinion. See Brown Bag, 960 F.2d at 1475-
77; Telemarketing Resources, 1990 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH), at 23,088.
162. Cooling Systems and Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator, Inc, 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.
1985).
163. Id. at 491 (citing Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736
F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984)).
164. See McCulloch v. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987); Aliotti v. Dakin &
Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
165. See, e.g., Harper House v. Nelson, Inc. 889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989); Data East
USA v. Epyx, 862 F.2d 204 (9th 1988); Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446
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Bag Software left this issue open.'
3. Using Analytic Dissection to Separate
Protectable Expression
When applying the third principle, that analytic dissection
of similarities is appropriate for separating protectable from
unprotectable expression, the underlying issue is whether
expert testimony will be allowed to aid the analytic dissection.
The use of expert testimony to separate protectable expression,
either during or before the intrinsic text, could prevent the
problem inherent in the audience test; namely, that a lay
observer might find superficial similarity when the unprotect-
able expression requires expertise to discern or overlook simi-
larity when it is hidden, as between different media. These
were the same reasons expert testimony was introduced in the
extrinsic test.'67 Especially with respect to high technology
cases, expert testimony would help with the dissection.'6
Most of the cases, however, that have allowed analytic dis-
section of similarities of expression have limited this analysis
to the intrinsic test, implying that expert testimony is not per-
mitted to aid in the analysis.6 9 In some cases, this phenome-
(9th Cir. 1988); Aliotti v. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987); Cooling Systems
and Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator, Inc, 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985).
166. See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1476 n.4 (9th Cir.
1992).
In addition, a recent United States Supreme Court case, Feist Publications v.
Rural Telephone Service, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991), may mandate limiting the intrinsic
test to protectable expression. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at
§ 13.03[E][1][b]. The Feist court stated that to establish infringement, a plaintiff must
prove the "copying of constituent elements of the work that are original." Feist, 111 S.
Ct. at 1296. However, because the defendant in Feist engaged in verbatim copying, the
case turned on the doctrine of "fair use" instead of requiring a substantial similarity
analysis. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[E][1][b]. Thus, the import of
the language of Feist remains to be determined. Brown Bag, although decided after
Feist, did not clarify the issue.
167. See also supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
168. For example, a user interface designer may order the sequence of commands
on a "menu" (a list of available options) according to the optimal means to search the
sequence. Thus, there may be very few ways to actually express this same sequence,
although many seem possible. Under the merger doctrine, such expression should not
be protectable. Because many similar situations in user interfaces exist, a non-expert
will probably find that user interfaces for products with the same functions, targeted
to the same market, look alike. Without the help of expert testimony, it is highly
likely that protection will be granted to certain kinds of expression, thereby limiting
healthy competition. See also infra notes 184-205 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Data East USA Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988); Aliotti
v. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987); but see Olson v. National Broadcasting Co.,
855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).
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non may depend more on where this rule was discussed in the
court's opinion."O Also, most of the opinions addressing this
issue were written before the sanctioned expansion of the
extrinsic test. Thus, in these earlier opinions, all analysis of
expression was discussed with reference to the intrinsic test.
In contrast, Brown Bag devised yet another approach by
including the dissection of similarities of expression as part of
copyright ownership analysis and not part of the extrinsic or
intrinsic test at all.' 7 '
For example, in Aliotti, the court implied that the analytic
dissection separating out protected expression should be done
in the intrinsic test. First, the court ended its discussion of the
extrinsic test when it stated that "the extrinsic test is satisfied
here because both lines of products depict the same subject
matter-stuffed dinosaur toys," and that the district court
improperly relied upon dissection of the dissimilarities72 in
the intrinsic part of the test.17 3 Second, the court stated that
analytic dissection of the similarities to separate out the pro-
tected expression should be done, to the extent necessary, in
the intrinsic test.17 4 Third, the Court analyzed the similarities
and concluded that none of them consisted of protectable
expression. 7 5 Thus, the Aliotti court intended the analysis to
be (1) different from the analysis done in the extrinsic test,
and (2) performed separately in the intrinsic part of the test.176
Contrary to Aliotti, in Olson, the court used the analysis it
performed in the extrinsic test to separate out the protected
expression later in the intrinsic test.177 Also, unlike Aliotti,
170. See, e.g., Cooling Systems and Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485
(9th Cir. 1985) (where the court only reviewed the intrinsic analysis and, as a result,
performed analytic dissection during the intrinsic analysis).
171. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465,1475-76 (9th Cir. 1992).
172. Dissection of the dissimilarities appears to refer to the separation of ideas
from expression in the extrinsic test. The court maintains that this kind of dissection
would still be inappropriate in the intrinsic test because it "distracts a reasonable
observer from a comparison of the total concept and feel of the works." Aliotti, 831
F.2d at 901.
173. Id.
174. "To the extent that it is necessary to determine whether similarities result
from unprotectable expression, it is appropriate under Krofft's intrinsic test to
perform analytic dissection of similarities." Id.
175. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
176. Data East also supports this view. It not only used the Aliotti language
verbatim when it described the intrinsic test, it also emphasized the difference
between the words "dissimilarities" and "similarities." Data East USA Inc. v. Epyx,
Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988).
177. See Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the Olson opinion did not distinguish between analysis of the
similarities and the dissimilarities. Instead, the court analyzed
the similarities and dissimilarities of the plot, theme, mood,
pace, and characters in the extrinsic test. 78 Then, in the
intrinsic part, the court found that "[b]ecause those similarities
that do exist arose from unprotectable scenes a faire, there
exists no substantial similarity of protectable expression under
the intrinsic test. '179 The opinion did not perform another
analysis of expression, but impliedly used its analysis from the
extrinsic text. Therefore, unlike Aliotti, the analysis in Olson
was performed as part of the extrinsic test where expert testi-
mony can be heard. Because Olson used the reformulated
extrinsic test, which includes an analysis of objective expres-
sion, there was no need to repeat the analysis of similarities in
the intrinsic test. 80
In summary, although the Ninth Circuit Court supports
the use of analytic dissection to separate protected from unpro-
tected expression, it is not clear whether this analysis includes
the use of expert testimony. Also, Brown Bag establishes that
with the reformulated extrinsic test, this analysis is separate
from the substantial similarity analysis.' It would not make
sense to allow expert testimony to find that every similarity
was unprotectable in the objective analysis, and then find the
same similarities protectable in the subjective analysis simply
because the lay observer was not informed.
4. Future Ramifications to User Interfaces
In summary, recent Ninth Circuit cases have established at
least three new principles: (1) that the extrinsic test includes
an objective analysis of expression; (2) that the intrinsic test
should be limited to protected expression for works whose
scope of copyright protection is limited; and (3) that analytic
178. Id. at 1451. For example, even though the court found similarities in the
theme, mood, and pace of the two works, it decided that these similarities were
"common to the genre of action-adventure television series." Id.
179. Id. at 1453. This is the second principle that limits the intrinsic test to
protectable expression. See notes 140-48 supra and accompanying text.
180. A court must decide whether the expression is protectable in the extrinsic
test in order to decide whether such expression supports a claim of substantial
similarity.
181. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
The Brown Bag court arguably made it easier to reformulate or clarify this
principle by removing the dissection outside the substantial similarity analysis where it
no longer must accommodate Krofft.
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dissection can be used to separate protected from unprotected
expression. Only the first of these principles has been explic-
itly applied to user interfaces.
At least one scholar has advocated incorporation of these
principles into modern copyright law. In his treatise on copy-
right law, David Nimmer incorporates all three of these new
principles into his approach to the substantial similarity test
called "successive filtering analysis," which he advocates apply-
ing to user interfaces.1 2 This test is discussed in Sections IV
and V of this Comment.
8 3
III. AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING REVISED
SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TESTS
Assuming the Ninth Circuit will refine its substantial simi-
larity test, this section defines a framework for analyzing pro-
posed substantial similarity tests for user interfaces. This
framework is comprised of a set of goals that are intended to
maintain the careful balance between giving authors incentive
by rewarding their creativity with limited monopolies and
reserving the results of new creativity for unrestricted public
use. In this respect, the goals for a user interface substantial
similarity test are no different than those for any subject mat-
ter. On the other hand, the goals for a user interface substan-
tial similarity test must also account for the unique aspects of
user interfaces.
Perhaps the most unique aspect of user interfaces is that
creativity is significantly restrained by the objectives embodied
in every software program.184 The irony is that modern
"graphical user interfaces"''1 5 appear to use more creative
forms of expression than older style user interfaces, but in fact
182. NIMMER ON CopyRiGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[F]. The "successive filtering"
method discussed in the treatise is based upon David Nimmer et al., A Structured
Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright
Ikfringement Cases, 20 ARI. ST. L.J. 625 (1988).
183. See infra notes 226-30, 237-84 and accompanying text.
184. One such objective is run time efficiency. Run time efficiency is the speed at
which the program performs while it is carrying out its designated task.
185. A graphical user interface, in its most simple form, is a user interface that
takes advantage of bitmapped display hardware (screens) to draw text and graphics on
the screen simultaneously, instead of drawing graphical objects using textual
characters within lines of text. A bitmapped display is a display which allows a
program to communicate with it in terms of "X, Y" coordinates instead of rows and
columns. A bitmapped display is "drawn to" by turning on and off individual pixels
(lightable points) on the screen. For a more thorough explanation of graphical user
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they are restrained by a whole new set of external problems.'
Therefore, it is important to have some understanding of these
restraints before discussing the goals for a user interface sub-
stantial similarity test.
A. Restraints on User Interface Expression
Software, including user interfaces, is restrained by many
external factors. First, choices for implementing a particular
feature may be limited by efficiency and logic concerns. 18 7 For
instance, a particular software solution may be faster and more
"elegant."'" Protecting a functionally optimal solution in such
instances effectively grants a monopoly to one person and
makes it difficult for others to compete.'89
Second, the nature of the problem to be solved, or the par-
ticular customer to which the interface is targeted, may limit
interfaces and their future in the personal computer market, see Jim Seymour, The
GUI: An Interface You Won't Outgrow, PC MAGAZINE, Sept. 12, 1989, at 97.
Some examples of graphical user interfaces are Microsoft's Windows (TM),
Apple's Macintosh Finder (TM), and Sun Microsystems' Sun/Open Look (TM). Most
graphical interfaces include some form of windows (bordered, usually rectangular
boxes) in which application programs place their information and menus, which allow
the user to select tasks to perform. An example of a character-based interface on the
personal computer, which implemented a primitive form of windows, is Microsoft's
DOS Shell.
186. For example, a flashing effect on the screen when moving "objects" around
with a pointing device such as a mouse or joystick creates a problem specific to
graphical user interfaces.
187. Nimmer proposes that efficiency and logic should dictate elimination of the
resultant limited range of choices from the list of protectable expression under the
merger doctrine. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[1F[21.
188. For example, it is more user task efficient and computer time efficient to use
something called "cascading menus" or "nested menus" for user options that are
intimately related. A cascading menu typically uses main menus and submenus such
that each submenu appears to slightly overlay its parent when displayed on the screen.
This technique allows a user, who employs a hardware mouse, to manipulate the
screen pointer with very little hand movement when making selections of particular
options. This promotes computer-human interface design principles by maintaining
user efficiency and simplicity. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
189. At a recent conference on both the legal and computer aspects of copyright
protection of computer software, conferees endorsed the proposition that functionally
optimal solutions should not be protected. Although there was not agreement on all
issues, the conferees agreed that copyright should not protect aspects of an interface
that optimize, in a way for which there is no viable substitute, such design goals as
rapid execution, accuracy of results, error reduction, number and/or speed of
keystroke functions, or time, effort, or cost of becoming skilled at using the programs.
Such functionally optimal aspects of an interface should not be protected regardless of
whether the original designer consciously employed systematic design analysis aimed
at optimization or simply discovered an optimal interface aspect by intuition. Last
Frontier Conference, supra note 13, at 28.
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suggestions and, therefore, expression. 19° For example, a cus-
tomer may request a user interface for an accounting program
and may dictate the choice and sequence of certain procedures.
If only one vendor were allowed to copyright the expression
involved in the arrangement and selection of such procedures,
other vendors might not be able to compete for enhancements
or new versions of the software in subsequent contract bids.
Third, external requirements, such as hardware standards
and compatibility with other software interfaces, may restrain
the expression available to a user interface designer.' 91 For
example, a word-processing program that can manipulate
charts from a spreadsheet program must be able to communi-
cate with the spreadsheet program and receive data from it. In
order to communicate, the word-processing program needs to
understand the spreadsheet program's data format. This
requirement may dictate the use of particular data struc-
tures192 that show up in the user interface, such as in dialogs
that allow the user to manipulate the spreadsheet chart
information.
Fourth, software industry standards may restrict the flexi-
bility of expression in an interface. 93 Many system software
vendors'4 provide user interface guidelines to promote a par-
ticular "style and behavior"'95 of applications. Many vendors
consider these guidelines to be "de facto" industry standards
and the wave of the future." Thus, applications will typically
honor these guidelines in order to be considered part of the
190. See NImMER ON CopyRiGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03F[3][d].
191. See id. § 13.03[F][31[a]-[b].
192. "Data structures" are programmatic units for keeping track of data. Often
they contain multiple parts for different types of related data. See, e.g., id. § 13.03[F][1]
n.288.
193. See id. § 13.03[FI[3][c].
194. "System software" refers to any software that runs under typical end-user
applications, such as word-processing and spreadsheet programs. For example, system
software includes the operating system, which is software that controls hardware and
software resources such as the printers, the mouse, and the screen. System software
also includes the basic user interface ("shell") that is shipped with the system, to
perform basic file management, access printers, and execute applications.
195. The term "look and feel" has been overused, is devoid of meaning, and is
often confused with the copyright term "total concept and feel." See id. § 13.03[F]
n.277, for an explanation of the evolution of the term "total concept and feel."
196. For example, IBM advocates the Common User Access SAA ("IBM CUA")
standard for PC interfaces running on top of OS/2, while Apple Computer Corp.
advocates its style-guide for Macintosh applications, and Microsoft Corp. advocates its
Windows style-guide for Windows applications. See, e.g., Jim Seymour, Who Owns the
Standards, PC MAGAZINE, May 26, 1987, at 174.
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system family and to enable users to move freely between
applications. The result is that many user interfaces running
on the same system software look very similar. 97
Fifth, some copyright adverse computer professionals
believe that the evolution of the industry depends on the abil-
ity of programmers and designers to build upon the work of
their predecessors. 9 ' This belief is not really a restraint, but
an opinion that certain types of expression are major break-
throughs that ought to be left in the public domain. Thus, if
these breakthroughs are protected, the progress in the indus-
try may be stifled."s Perhaps one way to address this concern
is under the idea/expression dichotomy doctrine: major break-
throughs, as viewed by software industry experts, could be
classified as unprotectable ideas during analytic dissection.2°°
Sixth, although user interface design is an art, science may
also dictate particular design choices."° If a user interface
designer is sensitive to computer-human interaction ("CHI")
principles, certain choices will be preferred.2  For example,
some studies show that blue is not a good color for readable
197. A wide variety of user interface expression is covered in these guidelines,
such as what keys are to be used for what types of functions, how long names of
commands can be, what the names should be for particular functions like "Help" and
"Open File," where icons are to be placed on the screen, and how the menu bar looks
and is arranged. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, COMMON USER ACCESS
ADVANCED INTERFACE DESIGN GUIDE (1989); APPLE COMPUTER, INC., HUMAN
INTERFACE GUIDELINES: THE APPLE DESKTOP INTERFACE (1987). These are just
samples of the many stylistic choices governed by these standards.
198. See Bixby, supra note 3, at 48.
199. Id.
200. For example, there is much dispute as to whether "overlapping" windows as
opposed to "tiled" windows is an idea or expression. This feature was one of the
alleged infringements in part of the Apple Computer v. Microsoft and Hewlett-
Packard lawsuit. See Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12219.
201. The Last Frontier Conference conferees did not agree on how copyright law
should consider restraints caused by computer-human interaction principles. Because
it is a developing field, some were concerned that vendors may use some of these
factors as "(a) an excuse to copy in avoidance of investing their own development
costs, or (b) an unfair free ride on another's popular creation." Last Frontier
Conference, supra note 13, at 26. These principles are verifiable by testing and do
influence design decisions.
202. Also, it is becoming more prevalent for software vendors to test their
interfaces on potential customers before releasing them. This process is called
"usability testing." If one believes that these CHI principles have merit, then usability
testing may yield results that will indicate that a particular type of expression is
consistently better than another, perhaps with respect to ease of learning, ease of use,
or task efficiency. These test results then may cause two different interfaces to
incorporate similar choices of expression for implementing the same ideas. It would be
grossly unjust to protect these types of optimal solutions.
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text on computer screens. m Also, because people skim text
from the upper left to the lower right, important information
should be placed in the upper left corner where it is easy to
locate.2 "4 User interface designers sensitive to these factors
will use them in their designs.
Many of these restraints are not obvious to those who do
not design user interfaces. A lay observer may mistakenly
determine that two user interfaces are similar because they
appear similar, even though the details of their implementa-
tion may be very different. Thus, it makes sense to limit the
lay audience review of user interface similarities to protectable
expression using the approaches taken by Cooling Systems,
Data East, and other cases involving factual or functional
works. °5 Moreover, given the complexity of analysis involved,
expert opinion may be required. In any event, a substantial
similarity test suitable for user interfaces must allow for the
sifting out of expression that is not protectable due to these
restraints.
B. Goals For a Revised Test
Because of their restricted nature, user interfaces should
be granted limited copyright protection. The goals listed in
this section balance incentive with the uniquely restricted
nature of user interface expression and promote reasonable
copyright protection of user interfaces. Significantly, however,
the goals associated with user interface substantial similarity
tests may apply equally as well to other functional works and
factual compilations because they also merit limited copyright
protection.
1. Allow and Promote Standardization and Compatibility
The software industry is concerned with providing easy-to-
learn and easy-to-use software through standardization and
compatibility. 2° 6 As discussed earlier, standardization or com-
203. Gerald Murch, Physiological Principles for the Effective Use of Color, 4 IEEE
COMPUTER GRAPHICS AND APPLICATIONS 49 (Nov. 1984).
204. This theory supplies one of the reasons, for example, in graphical user
interfaces that the "File" menu is often placed as the first menu, in the upper left
corner. See, e.g., ANDREW MONK, FUNDAMENTALS OF HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION
155 (1985).
205. See supra notes 121-27, 149-56 and accompanying text.
206. In terms of promoting progress of the arts and sciences, there is a tension
here between promoting user friendliness as progress in and of itself and simply
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patibility may restrain the freedom of expression available to
user interface designers. 20 7 Assuming that standardization and
compatibility are desirable, as a matter of policy, expression
effectuating standardization or compatibility should not be pro-
tected by copyright.' 8 In such situations, therefore, the sub-
stantial similarity test should allow the trier of fact to sift out
such expression.
2. Foster Competition
One method of maintaining the constitutional mandate to
promote science and the useful arts2° is to foster competition.
If monopolies are inadvertently granted to those with the opti-
mal solutions, then competition will be hampered. The second-
comers' user interfaces will be less desirable because they are
not the best. Perhaps the only way left to compete would be
through cheaper, inferior products--a result that arguably does
not promote science or the useful arts.
On the other hand, if too little protection is given, vendors
might not invest in user interfaces that cost a lot of money to
develop and test.210 Although copyright could be an incentive
to software development, 1 ' software developers and vendors
are typically motivated by a combination of profit and the crea-
promoting new features. Standardization, which will promote user friendliness, may
in practice discourage the development of new features in some areas because
standardization usually implies that "difference is bad." However, this tension is really
no different than purely scientific progress in other industries that may be held back,
for example, by environmental concerns. Perhaps a more enlightened view of
"progress in the arts and sciences" would include a concept of "healthy progress."
207. See supra notes 191-97.
208. Perhaps the merger doctrine could be invoked to support this policy.
There are those who believe that copyright protection of these standards will
work directly against promotion of the standards because licensing costs would be
prohibitive.
209. The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to "promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8.
210. This theory is the basis behind an entire article devoted to the application of
copyright law using lessons learned from patent law. See Wiley, supra note 6. This
article advocates that copyright protection should only be given where it was necessary
as an incentive to develop the product. Id. at 149. Expert testimony would be used to
determine whether copyright protection would have been objectively necessary. Id. at
149, 180. The test promoted presumes that copyright would have been needed, and it is
the responsibility of the defendant to prove otherwise. Id. at 151.
211. User interface designers should at least consider the ex post facto effect of
infringement.
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tive challenge of furthering technology.212
The doctrines of copyright law must be sufficiently flexi-
ble to balance competition with protection. In particular, the
substantial similarity test must allow the trier of fact to pro-
hibit making similar expression protectable when such protec-
tion would inhibit necessary competition. On the other hand,
when protection is necessary as an incentive to invent, or when
unnecessary to achieve competition, similarity in expression
should be protectable, if possible.
3. Account for the Functional and Aesthetic Role
Because user interface software has both a functional and
aesthetic role,213 the substantial similarity test should provide
protection to only the aesthetic portions of the interface. CHI
principles may shed light on whether particular expression
choices have been made for functional reasons. Also, software
and hardware compatibility restraints may dictate that certain
expression has a predominantly functional role. In these cases,
copyright law must not protect ideas, functions, or processes.
The trier of fact must, therefore, have sufficient expertise and
data during the substantial similarity test to differentiate
between the functional and aesthetic roles of particular ele-
ments of expression.
4. Enable Fine-Line Differentiation Where Protection
Should Be Limited
With user interfaces, as with other subject matter, it is dif-
ficult to distinguish between protectable and unprotectable
expression and between unprotectable ideas and expression.
An understanding of many of the restraints discussed above
can help a trier of fact to differentiate what is protectable from
what is not. Therefore, the substantial similarity test must
allow sufficient analysis or dissection to enable these fine
distinctions.
212. Perhaps, however, copyright protection would have greater incentive, in
addition to profit motives and technical challenge, if the scope of protection were not
so thin.
213. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dual
purpose of user interfaces.
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5. Provide Useful Guidelines to User Interface Designers and
Software Developers
Because copyright law as applied to user interfaces is
unpredictable, user interface software designers and develop-
ers do not know what "ideas" they are allowed to copy from
their predecessors and what they must reinvent to avoid
expensive and wasteful lawsuits.2 4 As the courts clarify sub-
stantial similarity law in other user interface cases, they will
establish guidelines to avoid infringement.
Although different approaches have been taken to avoid
infringement, many are impractical because they do not allow
a designer or developer to build on others' work in a compati-
ble way.215 Developing user interfaces that are different from
one another may not be in the best interest of the consumer:
the consumer is charged with learning costs and other commu-
nication costs when interfaces are incompatible.
6. Enable Consistent Application of Principles
As is true with all areas of the law, any substantial simi-
larity test should be formulated such that it can be applied
consistently in a vertical manner across all user interface (and
software) decisions and in a horizontal manner across all sub-
ject matter.
7. Enable Resolutions Perceived as "Fair"
Software developers sometimes feel that their industry is
different because they have been permitted for years to appro-
priate others "expression." 216 Such a difference, however, may
not necessarily exist. Perhaps the industry as a whole has a
more lenient definition of what an "idea" encompasses, thus
allowing more "expression" to be copied. Maybe this view is
due in part to the difficulty of separating function from form.
214. Bixby, supra note 3, at 47.
215. One example of such an approach is the clean room procedure. Independent
development is done without allowing the developers or designers to be exposed to
competitors' programs. See, e.g., Last Frontier Conference, supra note 13, at 23. There
are several problems with this approach. First, ideas may be reinvented unnecessarily
thereby creating a cost to society. Second, compatibility may not be fostered where
needed. Third, it is unlikely, with the prevalence of personal computer software on
the market, that designers and developers of user interfaces have not been exposed at
some time to most of what is available publicly. How does one implement a clean
room procedure for someone with twenty years of industry experience?
216. See Bixby, supra note 3, at 48.
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In any case, this view will change as the industry becomes
older and the creative leaps available become smaller.
Whether or not this difference really exists, the substan-
tial similarity test should promote decisions that are perceived
as "fair" and "just." Perhaps courts and attorneys should
incorporate computer industry views, not just legal views, of
past court decisions when defining and arguing new law. If
some decision has evoked an outcry of "unfairness," courts
may not be maintaining the overriding goals of promoting sci-
ence and the useful arts for the computer industry. Although
no clear answer to the problem of promoting fair decisions
exists, any answer will evolve over time.
Thus, the goals for a substantial similarity test for user
interfaces include the following: (1) promote standardization
and compatibility; (2) foster competition; (3) account for the
dual functional and aesthetic role; (4) enable fine differentia-
tion where limited protection is available; (5) provide useful
guidelines to developers and designers; (6) enable consistent
application of principles; and (7) enable resolutions perceived
to be fair.
IV. Two ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR REVISION
The last two sections explored recent changes in the sub-
stantial similarity law in the Ninth Circuit and discussed an
analytic framework for evaluating substantial similarity tests
applied to user interfaces. The next two sections focus on
approaches available to the court for revising the substantial
similarity test. Specifically, this section discusses the
approaches the court could take to revise the test and identifies
the choices on opposite ends of the spectrum. The last section
advocates an approach and evaluates it using the analytic
framework developed in Section III.
As discussed in Section II, the law currently differentiates
substantial similarity tests based on subject matter. Shaw217
reformulated the test from an extrinsic/intrinsic approach to
an objective/subjective expression approach, at least in the
case of classic literary works.218  Arguably, Brown Bag
Software extended this reformulation to all subject matters.1 9
217. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1990).
218. Id. See supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
changes announced in Shaw.
219. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992). See
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Also, for functional works, factual works, video games, and
other works with limited copyright protection, the court limits
the intrinsic test to a comparison of protectable expression.22 °
Thus, the court could revise the test as applied to user inter-
faces by developing another subject matter-specific version of
the test. Alternatively, the court could develop a generic sub-
stantial similarity test. These two options are addressed in
turn.
A. Subject Matter-Specific Substantial Similarity Test
A subject matter-specific version of the test would involve
an abstract list of objective elements of expression for com-
puter software, similar to that used for classic literary works,
to be used in the extrinsic analysis.221 This test would require
identifying the specific concrete elements for the comparison
of user interfaces, similar to the "plot, themes, dialogue, mood,
and setting" compared in classic literary works.222 The con-
crete element categories would not necessarily indicate protect-
able expression, they would simply identify what should be
analyzed and compared to find substantial similarity.
The court in Brown Bag Software applied such an analysis
in the extrinsic evaluation of two user interfaces.2 3 Although
the Ninth Circuit seems to favor a subject matter-specific
approach, it did not decide this issue in Brown Bag Software
because user interfaces have traditionally been treated as liter-
ary works. The user interface elements mentioned in
Symantec's opening appellate brief in Brown Bag Software pro-
vide useful examples of possible categories for analyzing user
interfaces. 224 These elements are the structure, sequence, and
terminology of menus; keystroke shortcuts; color; and graphi-
cal layout.22 5 Other possible elements include the procedures
available for accomplishing tasks (similar to a "dialogue" com-
parison); the tasks available to be performed (similar to a
supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the changes announced
in Brown Bag.
220. See supra notes 112-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases in
which this test has been applied.
221. See supra notes 66-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the test that
evolved from Jason and its progeny.
222. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1990).
223. See Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d at 1465.
224. See Appellee's Opening Brief, Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960
F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992) (No. 89-16239).
225. Id.
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"theme" comparison); and the graphical representations cho-
sen, including the location of particular elements on the dis-
play screen. Also, examining the structure, sequence,
terminology, and visual representation of the various identifi-
able parts on the screen, such as menus and icons, appears sim-
ilar to analyzing characters in a classic literary work.
One difficulty in devising such categories is that graphical
interfaces embody different elements than character-based
interfaces. Therefore, developing an abstract set of elements
that might work across all user interfaces (and software in
general) would be a difficult task. To some extent, this diffi-
culty applies to classic literary works. For example, a movie
contains sound and words, but a book only contains words;
thus, all of the same elements are not present in both works.
In summary, a subject matter-specific approach is initially
appealing because it parallels recent case trends; however, this
approach would be cumbersome because it requires multiple
tests.
. Generic Substantial Similarity Test
An alternative approach to the subject matter-specific
approach would be to analyze objective expression in the
extrinsic test and limit the intrinsic test to protectable expres-
sion,226 but abandon the subject matter-specific definitions.227
Such a generic test could be applied across all subject matter.
One example of this approach is "successive filtering," which
breaks an infringed work into its component parts and then
applies the various copyright limiting doctrines, such as
merger, to analyze each component for protectability. 22 At
each successive stage, the doctrine eliminates the unprotect-
able components (expression), so that only protectable expres-
sion remains. The trier of fact then compares this remaining
protectable expression to the infringing work to find substan-
tial similarity.22
226. See Shaw, 908 F.2d 1465; Cooling Systems and Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator,
Inc, 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985).
227. This approach would leave behind objective criteria as defined for literary
works in Shaw and the tie to factual works essential to limiting the intrinsic test in
Cooling Systems. See supra notes 100-05, 121-27 and accompanying text.
228. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[F][1]-[5]. See also, David
Nimmer et al., Analyzing Substantial Similarity in Computer Software Infringement
Cases (Part 2), 6 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 1, 1 (Feb. 1989) [hereinafter Nimmer, THE
COMPUTER LAWYER].
229. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[F]. Any resulting alleged
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One difficulty inherent in this more general approach is
that courts lack guidelines for determining how each work is
to be broken down into its component parts.230 This difficulty
is mitigated through expert testimony, which can help dissect
the work into its components. In contrast, the subject matter-
specific approach to literary works provides criteria for dissect-
ing the works; however, the court must design separate tests
for each class of subject matter. Thus, the subject matter-spe-
cific approach may lead to greater complexity and to confusion
over the need for new specific subject matter tests. Also,
devising sufficiently abstract and flexible subject matter cate-
gories is difficult. Therefore, the minor practical difficulties
inherent in a general test are outweighed by the complexities
inherent in developing a repertoire of subject matter-specific
tests.
C. Other Approaches
Ignoring legal precedent momentarily, other approaches
have addressed different aspects of the substantial similarity
test. One such approach, suggested by Professor Marshall A.
Leaffer, is "flexibility. ' '23 1 Professor Leaffer advocates an
approach that depends on "the media involved, the variety of
copyrightable subject matter, and the fact situation. '23 2
According to Professor Leaffer, some situations lend them-
selves to a single, old-fashioned ordinary observer test, while
others lend themselves to a bifurcated test, or even a single
test that allows both lay and expert testimony.33 This
approach, however, is unpredictable, resulting in problems,
especially for litigation preparation. Also, a court would
require time to decide which test to apply.
Another approach, specifically addressed to computer dis-
play screens, has been suggested by Gregory C. Damman.2 4
Mr. Damman suggests that instead of protecting these highly
infringement is subject to the usual defenses. The usual defenses include de minimis
copying, independent creation, and fair use. Id. § 13.03[F][5].
230. The "component parts" Nimmer refers to appear to be synonymous with the
"concrete elements" or the "objective expression" referred to in Shaw. See, e.g.,
Nimmer, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, supra note 228, at 1, 5, in which Nimmer applies
the test to Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d
Cir. 1986).
231. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 276 (1989).
232. Id. Each of these approaches has been used in other circuits.
233. Id.
234. Damman, supra note 8.
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functional works, copyright law ought to create a rebuttable
presumption that there is no copyright protection for the
"sequencing and ordering of screen displays" and for "the posi-
tioning of text of the display screen. '"" Mr. Damman reasons
that this approach would increase standardization and decrease
the number of inappropriate monopolies granted for optimal
methods of expressing ideas.2- This approach, carried to an
extreme, would protect very little in a user interface. Thus, it
would countermand the progress of the arts and sciences
through copyright incentive.
In summary, the generic approach has the fewest difficul-
ties and incorporates the traditional copyright doctrines that
courts have experience in applying. The next section illus-
trates these advantages through an examination of the succes-
sive filtering method.
V. THE SUCCESSIVE FILTERING METHOD APPLIED
TO USER INTERFACES
The successive filtering method of substantial similarity
analysis, as developed by Nimmer, uses a general approach
that accommodates the needs of high technology.237 It incorpo-
rates recent modifications in Ninth Circuit substantial similar-
ity law, such as the evaluation of objective expression in the
extrinsic test and the limitation of the intrinsic test to protect-
able expression. 238 This method also promotes the goals of
copyright law as applied to user interfaces.2 9
This section illustrates how the successive filtering method
can be used to determine the substantial similarity of user
interfaces. After presenting this method, this section evaluates
the successive filtering method with respect to the analytic
framework set out in Section III. Finally, to show that this test
is practical, this section applies the successive filtering method
to a current user interface case.
A. Description of the Successive Filtering Method
The successive filtering method systematically applies
copyright doctrine to the dissection of an allegedly infringed
235. Id. at 445.
236. Id.
237. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supn note 6, at § 13.03[FI[1]-[5].
238. See supra notes 66-138 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 206-16 and accompanying text.
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work to determine which elements are protectable.240 The test
operates by successively narrowing the expression to be com-
pared. As each doctrine is applied, unprotectable expression is
eliminated from the analysis. After all the doctrines have been
applied, only protectable expression remains.241  The trier of
fact then compares this protectable expression to the alleged
infringing work to determine whether the elements copied
were quantitatively and qualitatively important.2 4 2 This latter
part of the test is "essentially a value judgment. ' 243
Specifically, before any doctrines are applied, the allegedly
infringed work must be dissected into its constituent elements.
Then, the following doctrines are applied in any order to elimi-
nate the unprotectable elements (ideas or expression).
First, the court applies the idea/expression principles. At
this time, all the elements that constitute ideas, processes, and
methods are eliminated from further analysis. Unfortunately,
Nimmer does not offer any new guidelines for what has been
traditionally a very difficult subject-matter specific process.2 "
Second, the court applies the merger doctrine eliminating
the expression that corresponds to ideas that can only be
expressed in one or a limited number of ways. In the case of
240. Underlying the test is the notion that only protectable expression should be
considered when judging whether a work has been infringed. Nimmer advocates this
approach regardless of the subject matter. In this manner, his test differs from the
current Ninth Circuit test, which has only applied this restricted intrinsic test to
factual and functional works and video games. Cf. supra notes 112-66 and
accompanying text.
241. NImmER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[F].
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Nimmer essentially resorts to Judge Learned Hand's famous "Abstractions
Test" as the means for performing this evaluation. Shaw quoting Judge Learned Hand
aptly states:
Any test for substantial similarity is necessarily imprecise: 'Upon any work,
and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality
will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out ... but there
is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected,
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his ideas, to which,
apart from their expression, his property is never extended.'
Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft Tele-
vision Prods. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930))).
For an enlightening discussion of some of the problems of applying successive fil-
tering to the idea/expression analysis of software, see Richard Beutel, Software Engi-
neering Practices and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy: Can Structured Design
Methodologies Define the Scope of Software Copyright?, 32 JuRIME'RICs 1, 21-32 (Fall
1991).
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computer programs, application of this doctrine eliminates all
elements dictated by functionally optimal solutions.
Third, the court applies the doctrines of scenes a faire and
lack of originality.245 These doctrines prohibit copyright pro-
tection of elements that necessarily follow from the "idea"
encompassed, that are standard treatments, or that originated
with someone other than the author. Application of these doc-
trines to computer programs allows elimination of all elements
dictated from external considerations, such as hardware stan-
dards, software standards, computer manufacturers' design
standards (compatibility restraints), target industry practices,
and computer industry programming practices (stock
treatments).
Fourth, and finally, elements taken from the public
domain are excluded from the analysis because they do not
owe their origin to the author and are, consequently,
unprotectable.
Once all of these doctrines have been applied, the set of
protectable elements remains.' The infringing work is then
compared to this set of protectable elements to judge whether
it has sufficiently "copied" the elements such that it can be
found "substantially similar."
B. Evaluation in Light of Test Goals
To judge whether a new test may reasonably be applied to
user interfaces, the test should be evaluated against some kind
of analytic framework. The goals set out in Section III will be
used for this purpose. These goals included the following: (1)
promote standardization and compatibility; (2) foster competi-
tion; (3) account for the dual functional and aesthetic role; (4)
245. The scenes a faire and lack of originality doctrines should be applied
separately, for expression may have originated with an author, yet be excludable
under the scenes a faire doctrine. For example, suppose an author is the first to
express an idea in a particular way, but this expression at some subsequent time
becomes standard treatment in the relevant industry. Arguably, even though the
expression originated with the author, it is now standard and should be excludable
under the scenes a faire doctrine.
246. This test addresses Judge Walker's earlier mentioned concern regarding
compilations in which unprotectable expression is removed from the intrinsic analysis
leaving nothing for comparison. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. In a
protectable compilation, in which the arrangement and selection are protectable but
the constituent parts are not, the selection and arrangement is one of Nimmer's
protectable elements that remain. Therefore, contrary to Judge Walker's analysis,
items remain on the list for comparison.
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enable fine differentiation where limited protection is avail-
able; (5) provide useful guidelines to developers and designers;
(6) enable consistent application of principles; and (7) enable
resolutions perceived to be fair. Unlike the unpredictable and
seemingly inconsistent nature of the current Ninth Circuit
substantial similarity tests, the successive filtering method
appears to satisfy many of these goals.
First, the test promotes standardization and compatibility
by permitting the court to remove the expression necessary to
support standardization and compatibility in the scenes a faire
portion of the analysis. In most cases, standardization and
compatibility dictate the way in which a particular user inter-
face idea can be expressed. For example, compatibility with
the IBM CUA 7 specification will dictate use of the Help key
in a particular manner.2 48 Thus, the court can eliminate this
unprotectable expression through the scenes a faire doctrine
because the expression of the Help key necessarily follows
from the choice of the idea of standardization or compatibility
with the IBM CUA specification.
Second, the test fosters competition through its flexibility
of application. For example, the court can balance the copy-
right protection needed to induce development with the free
access needed to foster competition using the merger doctrine.
Because competition is hampered when there are a limited
number of ways to express something,249 the court can use the
merger doctrine to eliminate this restrained expression from
further analysis leaving it unprotected.
Successive filtering also fosters competition through
manipulation of the idea/expression analysis. By manipulating
the level of abstraction, expression needed to foster competi-
tion could be considered an idea and rendered unprotectable.25
247. See supra note 196.
248. See supra notes 193-197 and accompanying text for a description of the effect
of system software standards.
249. For example, protecting a functionally optimal solution may prevent others
from marketing products of equal quality. See supra notes 209-212 and accompanying
text.
250. To illustrate, assume an electronic mail application user interface displays a
list of available users who receive mail from Customer A. For convenience, this list is
organized according to the frequency Customer A has contacted each company because
this organization replaces a procedure previously done by hand. If the idea of the user
interface is expressed simply as "maintaining a list of mail recipients," then there
might be many ways to express this idea and the form of the list would be considered
protectable expression. As a result, other mail application suppliers would not be able
to meet the requirements of Customer A. If, on the other hand, the idea was
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Third, the test differentiates between the functional and
aesthetic role of user interface expression and only protects
the aesthetic elements. The successive filtering test differenti-
ates well because it allows expert testimony to aid in the dis-
section.25' Furthermore, the court can eliminate the functional
elements of the user interface from the list of protectable
expression in multiple stages of the test, including the idea/
expression analysis, the merger analysis, and the scenes a faire
analysis; thus, the court will unlikely miss an opportunity to
eliminate a functional element.' 2
Fourth, the test supports fine line differentiation between
protectable and unprotectable elements. The court can accom-
plish this differentiation because the test applies standard
copyright doctrines that are sufficiently malleable: within the
successive filtering test, each doctrinal analysis is as flexible as
the parties make it. Significantly, a court may manipulate a
doctrine by changing the level of abstraction of the analysis to
achieve a particular outcome. However, results may be skewed
by the level of abstraction chosen. 3
Fifth, although the successive filtering test does not pro-
vide guidelines to user interface designers and software devel-
opers, it does provide a predictable form of analysis;
predictability promotes the development of guidelines. In
practice, a test will accomplish this goal only through consis-
tent judicial application of the doctrines and the test.
Sixth, the test allows a court to apply its principles consist-
ently. Specifically, the test is defined at a high enough level of
abstraction that a court can perform the same steps in the test
for each subject matter32' 4
Finally, successive filtering's flexibility enables fair resolu-
tions because each step of the test may be applied as the court
wishes, and because the parties influence the applicable level
expressed as "maintaining a list of mail recipients organized by company in order of
contact frequency," then the form of the list would be considered an unprotectable
idea.
251. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[F].
252. At some point, however, the court will have difficulty eliminating elements
with mixed functional and aesthetic roles that can be broken down no further. In that
case, the court should probably classify the element based upon its predominant role.
253. See, e.g., Beutel, supra note 244, at 21-30.
254. However, consistency across all types of software is more difficult because the
test does not provide any guidelines for applying each of the steps. The test relies on a
court's adeptness at applying legal precedent.
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of abstraction. 5 In this manner, the test can evolve without
changing its form.
In summary, from a theoretical perspective, Nimmer's suc-
cessive filtering test supports the goals discussed in Section III
and should be applied to user interfaces.
C Practicability of the Test
For a test to be useful in practice, it must yield reasonable
results and lend itself to easy application. This subsection
applies successive filtering to Apple Computer v. Microsoft
Corp., 2 a current case addressing the protectability of user
interface expression.257 The focus here is on ease of applica-
tion of the test and not on whether the particular results are
258right or wrong.
In 1988, Apple alleged that Microsoft Windows 2.03 (TM)
environment and Hewlett-Packard Co.'s NewWave environ-
ment infringed many of the user interface components25 9 of
Apple's Macintosh operating system.2e °
255. Note, however, that it contains no explicit mechanisms or checks for ensuring
fairness of its application.
256. This case has produced several interim court orders, including the granting of
Microsoft's motion for partial summary judgment regarding Windows 2.03. See Apple
Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12219 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (order
reaffirming partial summary judgment motions in response to Apple's motion for
reconsideration); Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5986
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (order granting defendant's partial summary judgment motion on
Windows 2.03); Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 779 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(preliminary order granting defendant's motion to reconsider affirmative defense of
lack or originality of constituent elements); Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F.
Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (order addressing miscellaneous interim motions); Apple
Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (granting partial
summary judgment); Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (order addressing miscellaneous interim motions).
257. See supra note 9 for the definition of a user interface.
258. An example of this test applied to older user interface technology has been
covered elsewhere. See, e.g., Nimmer, THE CoMPuTER LAwYER, supra note 228, at 1, 5
(applying successive filtering to Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986)).
259. The infringement allegation is complicated by a licensing agreement between
Apple Computer and Microsoft Corp., which is not discussed in this Comment.
260. See supra note 256 for case history.
The Macintosh operating system includes a component called the "Finder," which
is the graphical interface to system capabilities such as file and application
management, printer installation, and control of many other internal system
capabilities. See supra note 184 for a general explanation of graphical user interfaces.
The Finder uses graphical objects such as windows, icons, and pull-down menus.
These objects have functional as well as aesthetic roles and are currently the subject of
debate regarding the scope of user interface protection. See, e.g., Brown Bag Software
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After several phases of litigation, the Court narrowed the
alleged similarities of Windows 2.03 to ten visual items:
261
(1) overlapping windows in front of a muted
background;
(2) windows appearing partly on and off screen;
262
(3) top overlapping window displayed as the active
window;
2 6 3
(4) window brought to top of stack when mouse
clicked;
264
(5) gray outline of window dragged along with cursor
when mouse pressed on window's title bar;265
(6) window dragged to a new position when the mouse
is released after dragging the window's outline;
(7) newly exposed areas on screen are redisplayed after
the window is moved;
266
(8) icon may be moved to any part of screen by dragging
v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the idea of pulldown
menus is not protectable). A graphical interface shell is also present in the Windows
2.03 environment and it provides many similar functions to those provided by the
Macintosh Finder and uses windows, icons, and pull-down menus. The NewWave
environment also provides similar capabilities and is built upon the Windows 2.03
system.
261. Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1449-50 (N.D. Cal.
1991). These ten items formed the basis for the court's analysis of Microsoft's partial
summary judgment motion regarding Windows 2.03, which was granted in April 1992.
Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5986 (N.D. Cal. 1992). The
alleged infringements regarding NewWave and Windows 3.0 will not be addressed.
262. This item literally means that only part of the window is displayed on the
screen because the other part is logically off the screen. The opposite of this capability
is restricting the user's movement of windows so that they must appear completely on
the screen.
263. This item refers to the system's ability to designate which window has been
selected by the user to receive keyboard or mouse input.
264. This item refers to the action that occurs when there is a "stack" (similar to a
pile of cards) of more than one window and the user selects, using a mouse, a window
that is not the topmost. This item specifies that the system will respond to such a
selection by making the selected window the topmost window.
265. This item addresses the user feedback that occurs when the mouse is pressed
on the title area of a window. In the Macintosh and Windows systems, this feedback
occurs when the user attempts to move a window to a new position by dragging its title
bar around the display using a mouse pointer. The movement is completed when the
user releases the mouse button in the desired position. The gray outline of the window
shape follows the user's movement of the mouse pointer to show the user where the
window will be positioned if the user releases the mouse button.
266. This item refers to whether the screen display is refreshed when a window,
now moved, exposes an area of the display that it previously covered. If that area is
redisplayed, the contents previously obscured by the window appear on the screen
display.
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along with cursor when user pressed mouse on icon;2 6 7
(9) display of icons on screen behind any open win-
dows;268 and
(10) icon's title displayed beneath icon
Recently, the court ruled, on reconsideration of several
partial summary judgment motions, that all ten of these ele-
ments are unprotectable due to merger, scenes a faire, or other
limiting doctrines.2 6 9 The court did not, however, divulge any
of its reasoning in the opinion. These ten items comprise some
of the constituent elements of the Apple interface and, alleg-
edly, the Windows interface. Therefore, they provide a good
sample for analyzing how easy it is to separate out protectable
from unprotectable expression under the successive filtering
test.
Applied to these items, the successive filtering test first
breaks the infringed work into its constituent elements.27 0 The
successive filtering test then applies the idea versus expression
principle to the ten elements, removing any unprotectable
ideas.- z7 Depending on the level of abstraction chosen, many of
the ten items may be removed from the list as unprotectable
ideas. For example, one can define the idea behind item ten as
"using icons with their titles displayed beneath them" instead
of as "using icons." As another example, one can define the
movement of windows on the screen as "moving a gray outline
of a window, along with the cursor," as "the mouse is pressed
on the window's title bar." These examples illustrate the flexi-
bility of the idea versus expression doctrine and the potential
problems in applying the doctrine consistently.
Next, successive filtering analysis removes expression that
is unprotectable under the merger doctrine. Ninmer states
that this step involves expression restrained by logic and effi-
267. This item refers to the ability to move icons (graphical objects typically
emulating physical objects) similar to any other window. In many systems, this
capability exists because icons are implemented as a type of window and thus inherit
the capabilities of other windows.
268. This item refers to the ability of a window to obscure icons on the screen.
269. Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LExIS 12219 (N.D. Cal.
1992). An extensive analytic dissection of these software elements can be found in this
recent order. Id. The analysis in this paper is similar to the Apple court's.
270. This analysis does not intend to be comprehensive, it intends only to
illustrate the principles and steps involved.
271. These doctrines (steps) may be applied in any order. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 6, at § 13.03Fl n.284.
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ciency." The fifth item, a gray window outline displayed as
user feedback when a window is moved, provides a good exam-
ple of these restraints. First, the user interface software can
more efficiently move an outline of a window rather than the
entire window.273 This efficiently and accurately gives the user
feedback that portrays what is happening in the system. 4
Second, an outline typically appears gray as a result of coloring
every other pixel,275 or every third pixel, and is dependent on
the algorithm (mathematical formula) used to keep track of
the previous color of the pixel as the outline is moved over the
display.276 Because logic and efficiency limit the number of
optimal and reasonable solutions, it would be counterproduc-
tive to the purposes of copyright law to protect this expression.
Next, the successive filtering test removes items that are
unprotectable under the scenes a faire doctrine. This category
includes items that are standards within the software industry
or items that are dictated by external constraints, such as hard-
ware standards or programming practices.277 The tenth item in
the Apple case, displaying an icon's title beneath the icon, falls
into this category. Very few reasonable variations exist for dis-
playing the names of an icon: not displaying the title at all;
278
displaying the title within, above, below, to the left, or to the
right of the icon; or varying whether the title is centered, left,
or right justified.279  Arguably, a de facto industry standard
exists to place a title above or below an icon because users
272. Id. § 13.03[F][2].
273. To move the entire window, including its contents, by mouse would require
substantial memory and is typically limited by the speed of the computer. An entire
copy of the window would have to be stored in memory and the repainting of the
screen image would cause a flashing effect.
274. The capability of accurately portraying what is happening on the display is
referred to as "what you see is what you get" or "WYSIWYG."
275. For the purpose of this analysis, assume that a pixel is simply a lightable dot
on the hardware display.
276. One standard algorithm maintains the solid or dotted gray look, whereas the
other common algorithm, which uses the complementary color of whatever is
displayed, changes color, depending upon what the outline passes over.
277. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[F][3][a]-[c].
278. This choice was initially made in IBM and Microsoft's OS/2 Presentation
Manager, much to the chagrin of the user community. This violates the fundamental
CHI principles of not hiding information from the user, or of displaying information
that magically comes and goes, outside of user control.
279. Usability testing reveals that the most quickly scanned options display the
title above or below the icon because the titles are physically closest to the icon in




expect to find an icon's title there, just as titles are generally
centered below framed pictures.280
Under successive filtering analysis, a court may remove
elements during more than one step. For example, user inter-
face designers and developers commonly use overlapping win-
dows to implement the idea of a stack of paper, which is
central to the notion of a desktop metaphor.2 8 ' Because a
physical desktop can be expressed in limited ways, the most
effective of which uses overlapping windows, a court may elim-
inate the overlapping windows element through the merger
doctrine. Furthermore, because overlapping windows are com-
monplace in the industry, a court may eliminate this element
through the scenes a faire doctrine. Lastly, one can argue that
the concept of overlapping windows is an idea or a method of
organizing information on the screen and is too fundamental a
concept to be protected by copyright.
This analysis changes little if the constituent element is
stated as "overlapping windows in front of a muted back-
ground." However, overlapping windows on a muted back-
ground could be protectable expression of the unprotectable
idea of overlapping windows. For this proposition to be true,
the muted background must be protectable expression so that,
in connection with the overlapping windows, the entire ele-
ment is protectable. However, the muted background is proba-
bly an unprotectable element under the merger doctrine 28 2
because it provides an optimal method for displaying a back-
ground that will contrast with the windows, yet be unobtrusive
and support readable text.8 3 Therefore, because no subpart is
280. One could quibble with the number of implementations it takes to constitute
a de facto standard. In this case, such argument would be fruitless because one can
also argue that the limited set of reasonable solutions makes such expression
unprotectable under the merger doctrine.
281. Graphical user interfaces intending to emulate the office environment must
incorporate this metaphor. Last Frontier Conference, supra note 13, at 29.
282. Nimmer might classify this restriction under the scenes a faire doctrine, in
which he places external constraints that dictate choices of expression. NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 13.03[F][3]. However, one can view this scenario as a
choice dictated by logic and efficiency, which Nimmer would place in the merger
analysis. Id. § 13.03[F][2]. To reach the ultimate question of whether to eliminate this
expression from the list, the actual classification is unimportant.
283. Several technical reasons support the view that a muted background is
probably unprotectable expression, assuming a designer intends to find a background
color that contrasts with the white background color typically used for application
windows. First, choice is limited because few colors exist that are present in all
applications. There are sixteen system colors in Windows 2.03. Of these colors, few
are light enough to serve as background colors that will not interfere with a user's
1992]
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protectable, the item "overlapping windows in front of a muted
background" is also unprotectable.
Finally, items that are part of the public domain are
excluded from the protectable expression list. In this case,
none of the ten elements fall into this category.2s
After the elements have been filtered through these doc-
trines, a list of protectable expression emerges. The trier of
fact must then decide whether the infringing work is substan-
tially similar to this list of protected expression.
VI. CONCLUSION
Divergent case law in the Ninth Circuit has provided an
opportunity to reconsider previous assumptions about how
courts should analyze works for substantial similarity. Con-
trary to the original Krofft test, recent cases have recognized
that the court should compare expression between the works,
using expert testimony, before submitting the substantial simi-
larity question to the trier of fact. This technique increases the
court's role in analyzing substantial similarity, permitting more
summary judgments. Also, when copyright protection is lim-
ited by the functional or factual nature of the work, recent
cases have confined the Krofft audience or lay observer test to
the analysis of protectable expression. In this manner, the
court can prevent the trier of fact from finding surface similar-
ity where no real similarity exists or from failing to recognize
similarity where the similarity is obscured, such as between
works of different media. Finally, some recent cases allow
expert testimony to help the trier of fact separate protected
expression from the similarities.
Although Brown Bag Software ruled that the court must
analyze objective expression in the extrinsic test, recent Ninth
Circuit case law has not completely clarified how courts should
incorporate these changes into the substantial similarity analy-
ability to read text, such as the text under icons. Second, to create additional light
colors, a designer mutes the available colors by coloring a pattern of pixels (dots) on
the screen instead of coloring every dot as with a fully saturated color. A designer can
create a limited number of muted colors because certain patterns and colors will cause
distortion of overlaid text. Third, a designer must be aware of the psychological effects
and connotations of certain colors. For example, a pink background is not typically
acceptable in a business environment because of inherent biases. For all these reasons,
designers typically use some shade of gray as a background color where it is to be
contrasted with white and overlaid with text.
284. Items that are unoriginal are also excluded from the analysis, but that
analysis is very case specific and is not addressed here.
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sis of user interfaces. 5 Because user interfaces are highly
functional works, courts should apply the principles that have
been developed for other functional works. To apply these
new principles to user interfaces, courts should develop a new
substantial similarity test specifically for software subject mat-
ter or a more general substantial similarity test for software
subject matter.
Any new test that applies to user interfaces should do the
following: (1) promote standardization and compatibility; (2)
foster competition; (3) account for the dual functional and aes-
thetic role; (4) enable fine differentiation where limited protec-
tion is available; (5) provide useful guidelines to developers
and designers; (6) enable consistent application of principles;
and (7) enable fair resolutions.
Thus, this Comment illustrates that a substantial similar-
ity test invoking traditional copyright principles can be success-
fully applied to user interfaces, despite the complexities
involved in understanding high technology and the mixed
functional and aesthetic nature of user interface expression.
Specifically, the successive filtering method promotes the goals
necessary for a substantial similarity test purporting to work
well for user interfaces. Finally, the practicability of the suc-
cessive filtering method was demonstrated by applying its prin-
ciples to aspects of the Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp.
lawsuit.
285. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1992).
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